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EDITORIAL
Conditions in international financial markets 
remain fragile and have deteriorated significantly 
in recent weeks. Several key credit markets are 
either impaired or have ceased to function 
altogether, creating problems of liquidity 
management in the banking system and 
restricting credit availability. This reflects 
uncertainty about the location of financial losses 
related to rising default rates in the US mortgage 
market. According to financial market estimates, 
these losses are now expected to amount to 250-
500 billion USD compared to an earlier range of 
50-100 billion USD. 
The immediate effects of the turmoil have, so 
far, been largely confined to the financial sector 
where financial losses and declines in equity 
values are putting pressure on the capital of 
banks and of some insurance companies. 
However, the real economy is unlikely to escape 
unscathed. Global economic growth has been 
robust in recent years, but future performance is 
likely to be adversely affected by the turmoil via 
three main channels.  
The first channel is a generalised tightening in 
credit conditions, amid an abrupt correction in 
the mispricing of risk over recent years as 
investors become significantly more risk averse. 
Indeed, some overshooting in risk aversion 
cannot be excluded, implying very difficult 
financing conditions for both corporate and 
household sectors in the coming years. The 
lending capacity of banks will be reduced to the 
extent that the financial-market turmoil impacts 
significantly on their capital (e.g. bank losses in 
the US are now extending from their mortgage 
portfolios also to auto-loan and credit card 
portfolios). As private-sector debt levels are 
historically high in many parts of the global 
economy, the need to provision against further 
losses will further constrain bank lending. 
The second channel is US private consumption, 
which appears particularly vulnerable to current 
developments. The US consumer has been the 
engine of growth in the global economy for 
many years. While this role has become less 
important recently, a sharp downturn in US 
consumption would still have serious growth 
implications in the rest of the world.  
The third channel is economic confidence. The 
effect of financial crises on economic confidence 
is always difficult to predict but the longer this 
period of financial turbulence continues, the 
greater the risk is of significant negative 
spillovers to consumer and business sentiment.  
In the euro area, there are already some signs that 
the turmoil has begun to affect the non-financial 
sectors of the economy. Banks have tightened 
their credit conditions to both households and 
non-financial corporations. Although credit 
growth remains sustained, there are indications 
that funding to the non-financial corporate sector 
is slowing down. Business and consumer 
confidence have also weakened significantly since 
the summer.  
Although the euro-area economy is still 
underpinned by strong fundamentals, recent 
developments in financial markets will take their 
toll on real growth next year. According to our 
Autumn Forecasts, economic growth in the euro 
area is expected to decelerate from 2.6% in 2007 
to 2.2% in 2008. The forecast for 2008 is 0.3 pp. 
lower than in the spring. The downward revision 
mostly reflects the negative effect of the financial 
turmoil. The forecast is predicated on a gradual 
resolution of the distress in financial markets. 
Simulations show, however, that a deeper and 
more protracted financial crisis would entail 
significant additional losses in terms of economic 
growth.  
It is not only the financial turmoil which presents 
risks to the growth outlook, but also the high 
level of oil prices – which have temporarily 
pushed inflation to an unusually high level – and 
the external value of the euro. The euro's 
appreciation has been substantial during the 
autumn with its value in US dollars coming close 
to 1.50 at the end of November. In nominal 
effective terms, the euro is now more than 6% 
above its average value in 2006.  
The euro's strength has several causes. It reflects 
recent economic developments, namely better 
growth prospects in the euro area than in the US 
or Japan. In a longer-term perspective, it is also 
underpinned by the rising importance of the euro 
in the international financial system. The euro is 
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the second most important international currency 
after the US dollar. It is now extensively used in 
international debt markets and its role in 
international trade and in official foreign 
exchange reserves is growing gradually. The 
international use of the euro continues to be 
characterised by a strong regional and 
institutional pattern. It is expected that the 
expansion in the use of the euro will continue.  
However, any significant further appreciation 
would bring the euro outside the range that can 
be explained by fundamentals. The impact of the 
strong euro on euro-area exports, which has been 
limited so far, would then probably be felt more 
strongly. Further appreciation would also 
aggravate the lopsidedness of the ongoing 
adjustment to global imbalances in which the 
euro is already shouldering an excessive share of 
the adjustment burden. Although the euro area is 
running a broadly balanced current account and 
is therefore not a source of global imbalances, 
the necessary weakening of the US dollar against 
the currencies of the main trading partners has 
been associated mainly with a sharp appreciation 
of the euro. Yet in the meantime, other parts of 
the world, particularly in Asia, have been running 
large and growing current account surpluses 
whilst seeing only a modest appreciation of their 
currencies against the dollar and a depreciation 
against the euro. 
It is therefore important that the exchange rate 
impact of the rebalancing of global imbalances is 
spread more evenly across the main world 
regions. In particular, Asian economies with large 
current account surpluses should contribute to 
this process through an appreciation of their 
currencies. The recent discussions between 
Chinese authorities and representatives of the 
Eurogroup are a step forward in this respect. The 
two sides reached an understanding that it is 
necessary to make concerted efforts to intensify 
structural adjustment and avoid drastic 
movements of exchange rates so as to make due 
contribution to the orderly adjustment of global 
imbalances.  
Turning to the long-term growth performance of 
the euro area, this report provides some 
empirical evidence on the nature and importance 
of the structural reforms carried out in labour 
markets since the launch of the euro. This 
evidence is mixed. For the euro area as a whole, 
the reform process in the early years of the euro 
was characterised by a sequence of gradual 
reforms rather than by a few radical changes. 
Nevertheless, the data do show an encouraging 
shift in the pattern of reforms at the Member 
State level with more reforms being introduced 
by those countries that need them most. 
The report also investigates the possible causes 
of the disappointing productivity performance of 
the euro area. Most of the deterioration in the 
euro-area's performance relative to the US can be 
traced back to a small group of industries, namely 
the high technology part of the manufacturing 
sector and a few services sectors – wholesale and 
retail trade, financial and business services. On a 
more encouraging note, there are also a few 
industries – essentially 'network' industries – 
where the euro area has managed to consistently 
outperform the US over recent years.  
Our analysis suggests that the underperformance 
of the euro area reflects a diverse range of 
factors. It also lends support to the broad view 
that the productivity slowdown is linked to a 
generalised failure by Europe to sufficiently adapt 
its policies and institutions to a changing 
environment. Over the bulk of the postwar 
period, the euro area largely drove its 
productivity performance through a catching-up 
process focused in essence on imitating US 
technological advances. In recent years, catching-
up has increasingly given way to a phase in which 
euro-area countries operate at the global 
technology frontier. As a result, a large number 
of Member States have found it increasingly 
difficult to replicate the productivity successes of 
earlier decades. Being at, or close to, the 
technology frontier, demands a re-focusing of 
policies and institutions towards an innovation-
based economic model, with less emphasis on 
the imitation of available leading-edge 
technologies and a more intensive use of R&D 
and high-skilled human capital. 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
GDP growth in the euro area rebounded to 0.7% in the third quarter of 2007, broadly in line with the growth projected in 
the Commission's Autumn 2007 Forecasts. Growth continued to be driven by domestic demand. Investment picked up again 
after a pause in the second quarter and consumption growth remained at 0.5% supported by a very robust labour market and 
high confidence. Looking ahead, economic activity is expected to moderate. Tighter financing conditions, reduced confidence in 
the aftermath of the financial market turmoil, rising inflation as well as a cooling-off of the global environment will weigh on 
growth in the next quarters. Activity will, however, continue to benefit from robust employment growth and record-high 
profitability in the non-financial corporate sector.  
Developments in inflation volatility. The inflation performance has been exceptionally good since the launch of the euro, with 
most Member States registering their lowest inflation rates for 5 decades as well as a marked reduction of inflation volatility. 
Remarkably, this has occurred despite a series of adverse shocks. A preliminary review of the explanatory factors behind the 
decline of inflation volatility suggests that changed inflation expectations and greater credibility of monetary policy have played 
an important role. Clear improvements in the policy framework were instrumental in bringing about these changes.  
The evolving international role of the euro. From its introduction in 1999, the euro quickly emerged as the second most 
important international currency after the US dollar and it continues to consolidate its position. It is used extensively in 
international debt markets and its role in international trade and in official foreign exchange reserves has been growing 
gradually. Almost 10 years after its introduction, the internationalisation of the euro remains characterised by a strong 
regional and institutional pattern. The structural characteristics of the euro area – including the size of its economy and a 
macroeconomic framework geared at stability – support the international importance of the euro. Its international role could 
evolve in the future depending on a number of factors, including first and foremost the euro area's ability to develop more 
integrated and more efficient financial markets.  
The pace of structural reforms in EMU. Empirical evidence on possible changes in the pace of structural reforms since the 
introduction of the euro is limited and contradictory. While research based on indicators developed by the OECD seems to 
show that the introduction of the euro did not entail a pick up of reforms, evidence drawn from another dataset presented in 
this report suggests that this conclusion needs to be qualified. In the euro area as a whole, the reform process in the early years 
of the euro was characterised by a sequence of gradual reforms rather than by a few radical changes. However, data also shows 
an encouraging shift in the pattern of reforms at the Member State level with more reforms being introduced by those countries 
that need them most. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
A rebound in the third quarter of 2007 
Following signs of deceleration in the second 
quarter of 2007, economic activity in the euro 
area, rebounded in the third quarter. Quarter-on 
quarter GDP growth increased from 0.3% in the 
second quarter to 0.7% in the third quarter of 
2007. This is broadly in line with the 
Commission's Autumn Forecasts (0.6% q-o-q). 
The pick-up in activity in the third quarter was 
broad-based across most euro-area countries. It 
was particularly impressive in the Netherlands. 
Growth accelerated from 0.3% to 0.7% in France 
and Germany and from 0.1% to 0.4% in Italy. In 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 12 December 2007. 
Spain, however, GDP growth fell to 0.7%, the 
lowest q-o-q figure since 2004.   
Domestic demand supported by both private 
consumption and investment  
After the pause registered in the second quarter, 
gross fixed capital formation rebounded in the 
third quarter (0.9% q-o-q). After a sharp 
contraction in the previous quarter, activity in the 
construction sector recovered in the third 
quarter. Meanwhile investment in equipment 
continued to expand rapidly, at more than 4% in 
annualised terms.  
Despite a weather related rebound in the third 
quarter, recent developments in construction 
confirm the cooling-off of the housing sector. 
Over the past three quarters, year-on-year growth 
in residential construction investment has come 
down from 6.6% to 1.8%. Since the beginning of 
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2006, residential building permits have been on a 
steep downward trend. The y-o-y rate of change 
of permit issuance fell to its lowest level since 
1996 during the first half of 2007. Confidence 
indicators also show a cooling-off in the 
construction sector. The moderate weakening of 
sentiment in construction experienced for a year 
now seems to have become more pronounced 
since October.  
Graph 1: Profitability, euro area 
(Index 1999Q1=100; 1999Q1 –  2007Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent business indicators give mixed signals 
concerning future corporate investment growth.  
On the positive side, capacity utilisation in the 
manufacturing sector is still well above its long-
term average (84.2%) and profitability is at a 
record high (Graph 1). The growth of loans to 
the non-financial corporate sector has remained 
robust, broadly unchanged at 14.1% in 
September and close to the highest rate observed 
since the 1980s. Furthermore, industrial 
production grew by 3.9% y-o-y in the third 
quarter compared to 2.7% in the second quarter 
and started the fourth quarter on a relatively solid 
note (0.4% q-o-q and 3.8% y-o-y).  
On the negative side, the financial market turmoil 
has entailed a tightening of credit conditions for 
the non-financial corporate sector. The average 
interest rate for new non-financial corporate 
loans has risen to 6.1% in September, up 0.28% 
since July. This is the sharpest increase since the 
start of the ECB's interest rate statistics series in 
2003 (see Box 1). Meanwhile, recent data on 
business confidence are not very encouraging. 
While confidence is still reasonably robust (above 
its long-term average), it has been declining 
gradually since the summer while showing higher 
volatility (Table 2). For instance, the European 
Commission Business Climate Indicator fell from 
1.58 in April 2007 to 1.08 in September and to 
0.88 in October, followed by a rebound to 1.04 
in November. The PMI, NBB, IFO and INSEE 
followed similar patterns with small rebounds in 
November. In contrast, confidence in services 
deteriorated further that month.  
Turning to household spending, private 
consumption contributed 3 pp to GDP growth 
in the third quarter. It increased by 0.5% q-o-q, 
slightly down from 0.6% in the previous quarter. 
Private consumption has been on a modest 1.5% 
growth path since the beginning of the year.  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2006 Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
Carryover 
to 2007 2007 (2) 2008 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7 2.5 2.6 2.2 
Private consumption 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.7 2.1 
Government consumption 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.8 0.0 0.9 4.6 4.7 2.9 
Exports of goods and services 3.0 0.9 0.8 2.5 6.0 5.8 5.3 
Imports of goods and services 1.7 1.4 0.1 2.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Government consumption 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 
Changes in inventories -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Net exports 0.6 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2007 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph 2: Household saving rate and y-o-y consumption 
growth, euro area 
(in %; 1999Q1 –  2007Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent developments in euro-area consumption 
have been somewhat less dynamic than suggested 
by developments in the labour market and 
disposable income. The unemployment rate has 
continued to decline in recent months reaching 
7.2% in October. In the third quarter, 
employment growth decelerated on a quarter-on-
quarter basis (0.3% against 0.7% a quarter 
before) but reached its fastest year-on-year 
expansion rate since 2001 (1.9%). With such a 
robust labour market, developments in 
disposable income cannot explain the relatively 
subdued path of consumption. The saving ratio 
has actually been on an upward path since the 
beginning of 2006. It rose to 14.3% in the second 
quarter of 2007 and has probably continued to 
increase in the third quarter (Graph 2).  
Graph 3: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in %; Jan 2000 to Nov 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Looking ahead, the labour market is projected to 
remain relatively dynamic but this is unlikely to 
be sufficient to maintain consumer confidence at 
the very high levels experienced in the early part 
of 2007. Although still above its long-term 
average, household confidence has weakened 
significantly since the summer, reflecting mostly 
mounting concerns about the economic situation 
and deteriorating purchasing power (Graph 3). In 
light of recent developments in inflation, worries 
about purchasing power are unlikely to abate in 
the coming months, suggesting continued 
moderation in consumer spending in the months 
 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2006-2007 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.5 -0.07 93.1 52..8 54.9 96.8   -6.7 25.8 
Trough in latest 
downturn 89.3 -0.92 98.1 46.4 47.7 90.3 -26.5 -28.5 
November 2006 109.9 1.48 107.4 56.6 57.6 100.2 4.1 -27.4 
December 2006 109.8 1.54 107.5 56.5 57.6 102.5 2.4 -28.5 
January 2007 109.2 1.34 107.5 55.5 57.9 103.2 1.1 -19 
February 2007 109.7 1.51 107.5 55.6 57.5 102.6 2.0 -3.6 
March 2007 111.1 1.51 107.6 55.4 57.4 103.2 -1.0 2.9 
April 2007 111.0 1.59 107.7 55.4 57.0 104.2 2.3 5.8 
May 2007 112.1 1.50 107.9 55 57.3 104.7 3.9 16.5 
June 2007 111.7 1.52 107.9 55.6 58.3 102.8 6.5 24 
July 2007 111.0 1.35 107.7 54.9 58.3 101.7 4.5 20.3 
August 2007 110.0 1.41 107.2 54.3 58.0 100.4 2.8 10.4 
September 2007 106.9 1.08 106.7 53.2 54.2 98.7 1.4 -6.9 
October 2007 106.0 0.88  51.5 55.8 98.6 -1.8 -18.1 
November 2007 104.8 1.04  52.8 54.1 98.3 -0.5 -32.5 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
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ahead. Given the fact that household spending 
has lately become the main engine of growth, this 
can significantly impact the short-term outlook 
of the euro-area economy.  
World trade on a slight downward trend 
After a softening in the two first quarters of 
2007, the rate of growth of world trade picked up 
again in the third quarter. According to the latest 
estimates of the CPB Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis, world trade increased 
by 2.6% (q-o-q) in the third quarter of 2007, up 
from 0.8% in the previous quarter. These 
positive developments were also visible in euro-
area trade figures. Euro-area export growth 
increased from 0.8% q-o-q in the second quarter 
to 2.5% in the third quarter. At the same time, 
import growth also accelerated (from 0.1% to 
2.7%).  
Graph 4: World trade 
(y-o-y % changes in volume; 1999Q1 –  2007Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Nevertheless, the positive result of the third 
quarter should be interpreted with prudence. 
First, y-o-y growth figures show that world trade 
growth is on a downward trajectory (Graph 4). 
World trade in the third quarter increased by 
7.3% (y-o-y), down from the record high of 
10.9% in the first quarter of 2006. The loss in 
momentum is now discernible both in industrial 
and emerging economies, though the 
deceleration of import growth was particularly 
sharp in the US during the third quarter (0.6% y-
o-y in Q3 after 2.6% in Q2). Second, recent 
survey indicators of the world economy point to 
further growth moderation in the next few 
quarters. The November reading of the quarterly 
World Economic Survey indicates a deterioration 
of expectations for the next six months. The 
November Global Manufacturing PMI likewise 
points to a deceleration of growth in the global 
manufacturing sector in the fourth quarter. In a 
similar vein, export expectations in the euro-area 
manufacturing industry for the fourth quarter, as 
recorded in the European Commission's 
manufacturing survey, have weakened 
substantially. The euro-area business sector also 
became less optimistic as regards its competitive 
position outside the EU for the fourth quarter.  
Inflation increases substantially 
According to Eurostat's latest flash estimate, 
annual euro-area headline inflation rose markedly 
again in November to 3%, from 2.6% in October 
and 2.1% in September. The November reading 
is a six-and-a-half-year high and will push 
inflation for the fourth quarter of 2007 well 
above the 2.5% level projected in the 
Commission Services' Autumn Forecasts.  
Graph 5: HICP consumer prices, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in %; Jan 1999 – Oct 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
At the cut-off date for this publication, a detailed 
breakdown of HICP data for November was not 
yet available. However, provisional HICP data 
for Germany (3.3%, +0.6 pp), Spain (4.1%, + 
0.6) and Italy (2.5%, +0.2), as well as non-
harmonised CPI data for Belgium (2.9%, +0.7) 
and Slovenia (5.7%, +0.6), indicate strong 
increases in a number of Member States. 
The causes of this high rate are almost certainly 
due to the continued effects on the HICP of 
increased oil and agricultural commodity prices. 
This is confirmed by provisional November data 
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Box 1: Effects of financial turmoil on growth - an update 
 
This box updates the analysis of the implications of the financial turmoil presented in the previous issue of the 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. Events in financial markets so far suggest that the process of risk re-pricing will 
be far from smooth, instead oscillating back and forth. While the immediate turbulence in August was replaced by a 
calmer – but still far from normal – period thereafter, heightened credit fears returned in November in the face of 
increased bank write-downs, asset backed security downgrades and a further deterioration of the US housing market.  
In face of the ongoing interbank market dislocation, the ECB announced that extra liquidity will be provided for as 
long as necessary' with 'no deadline' and central banks have started to inject emergency liquidity into the system 
again. The picture of continued tension is also confirmed by the most recent ECB Bank Lending Survey (ECB-BLS) 
– released early October – where a significant number of banks reported hampered access to their usual funding 
sources. According to the survey, funding sources most affected are securitisation activities, medium to long-term 
debt securities issuance and interbank term funding.  
 
Protection against default cost in financial market 
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(1) Premium for insuring 10 million euro of senior debt in the 
financial sector against bankruptcy.  
Source: Commission services. 
(2) Premium for insuring 10 million euro of subordinate debt in the 
financial sector against bankruptcy. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
In addition, investor perception of financial institution default risk has risen sharply in recent weeks, surpassing levels 
reached in August. Indices tracking US sub-prime and commercial property debt touched new lows in November, 
suggesting that underlying credit losses for financial institutions in relation to the complex structured finance 
products might be still mounting. In line with a generalised investor flight to safety, government bond yields headed 
lower again.  
Currently, funding for financial intermediaries is far from normal. In addition, the stock market valuation of financial 
companies has declined, reducing the attractiveness of equity funding. However, euro-area banks were well 
capitalised when the current period of turmoil began in the summer. The average Tier 1 capital ratio increased 
slightly from 7.9% in 2006 to 8.1% over the first six months of 2007 and the weighted average total capital ratio 
stood at 11.3%, well above the regulatory minimum of 8%. On this basis regulatory capital remains adequate to cope 
with unexpected losses. 
Financial institutions face also the challenge of finding new profitable activities in an environment which might 
change fundamentally in the wake of the pre-turmoil world. They will probably have to adapt to a new era 
characterised by weaker lending growth, much less structured finance and securitisation activity and less merger and 
acquisition financing. In the absence of new profit opportunities, and with the time of easy credit gone, 
intermediation activities could be significantly affected. 
 
Impact for corporations 
While it is much too early to judge the full impact of the credit turmoil on economic activity, any assessment has to 
look at (i) credit conditions and (ii) credit flows to economic sectors, such as non-financial corporations and 
households.  
For the non-financial corporate sector, credit conditions are tighter now than before. The ECB-BLS indicated 
tightening credit conditions with 31% of all banks tightening during the third quarter of 2007 (against a net 3% of all 
banks reporting loosening conditions in the previous quarter). Long-term loans and loans to large enterprises were 
most affected by credit tightening. On balance, a net 28% of all banks expect to tighten loan conditions further in 
the current quarter. 
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In addition, the average interest rate for new non-financial corporate loans rose to 6.1% in September, up 0.28% 
since July, the sharpest interest rate increase since the start of the ECB interest rate statistics series in 2003. 
Furthermore, corporate credit spreads have widened to levels not seen in many years. Equity markets held up 
reasonably well until mid-October, although prices have started to decline again lately in volatile trading sessions.  
Since the outbreak of the turmoil in August, the amount of funding to the non-financial corporate sector shows 
some tentative signs of slowing down, especially in the non-bank sector. Net issuance of non-financial corporate 
debt securities declined in August and September by a combined EUR 6.3 billion (seasonally adjusted), adding up to 
one of the worst 2-month net contraction in corporate bond issuance since the start of the series in 1990. Quoted 
share net issuance declined by a non-seasonally adjusted EUR 0.7 billion in September, following a EUR 2.8 billion 
decline in August. Heightened volatility might have affected the pricing of new stock issuance and therefore 
impacted on funding possibilities there. In contrast, the picture is less clear as regards bank loans to the corporate 
sector, a dataset which is not seasonally adjusted. The year-on-year rate of growth of bank loans to corporations 
increased to 13.9% in October, up from 13.6% in July. As a result of this ambiguous set of data, it seems difficult to 
pinpoint a clear slowdown in non-financial corporate funding. That said, full results – when available – are expected 
to show that overall Q3 funding for the corporate sector came down significantly when compared with earlier 
periods this year.  
 
Impact for household sector 
Credit conditions have also tightened for the household sector. According to the ECB-BLS a net balance of 12% of 
all banks tightened credit conditions for loans for house purchase in the third quarter (22% tightening and 10% 
easing) against previous credit standards in the quarter before and a net 15% of all banks expect to tighten credit 
conditions further in the current quarter. For consumer credit and other household sector loans, a net 3% of banks 
eased credit conditions in Q3, but – on balance – 11% expect credit conditions to tighten in the current quarter. 
Interest rates charged by banks for new loans to the household sector have also risen steeply, but not by a record 
amount.  
Year-on-year growth in bank lending to the household sector decelerated slightly to 6.8% in October, down 
marginally from the 7% recorded in July before the beginning of the turmoil. Balance sheet pressure on households 
could also increase in the face of rising interest rates on outstanding loans and record levels of debt when measured 
against both GDP and gross disposable income.  
for Germany, which shows strong increases for 
the food and non-alcoholic beverages categories, 
as well as for liquid fuels.  
In October, energy inflation reached 5.5% in the 
euro area, contributing 0.5 pp. to headline 
inflation (up from 0.3 pp. in September and -0.1 
pp in August). The strong growth in HICP 
energy prices reflects recent strong increases in 
oil prices on the one hand and, on the other, base 
effects owing to the low level of oil prices 
registered in the second part of last year 
(Graph 6). Between November 2006 and 
November 2007, Brent oil prices measured in 
USD increased by 57%. In euro terms the 
increase was 38%, highlighting the dampening 
effects of the appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar over this period. 
Recent empirical estimations carried out by DG 
ECFIN suggest the pass-through of oil price 
changes to euro-area inflation to be strong and 
rapid. Results show a 10 euro increase in oil 
prices raises the HICP energy component by 
about 8 pp in the year following the shock, with 
most of the effect (73%) occurring within one 
month. Based on the observed increase in oil 
prices of 18 euros over the past year (between 
November 2006 and November 2007), the above 
estimate implies a total increase in HICP energy 
inflation of 14.4 pp and a resultant increase in 
headline HICP inflation of about 1.4 pp.2 
Sustained high oil prices (current futures put 
Brent oil prices at approximately USD 87 for 
December 2008), together with continuing base 
effects and lagged pass-through of past oil price 
rises, imply that energy price inflation will 
continue to contribute strongly to overall 
headline inflation over the next few months.  
                                                     
2  The estimations were carried out using an autoregressive 
model of order one for y-o-y HICP energy inflation on y-
o-y oil price changes and a number of lags at monthly 
frequency for the period January 1999 to October 2007. 
Tests for unit roots were carried out and confirmed the 
use of variables in differences/percentage differences. All 
explanatory variables were significant at the 1% or 5% 
levels and the fit of the model was very high, with an 
adjusted R squared of about 0.97. 
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Graph 6: Oil price developments 
(Jan 1998 – Oct 2007) 
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Food price inflation also contributed significantly 
to the increase in HICP inflation in October. 
Both processed and unprocessed food prices 
picked up significantly (to 3.8% and 3.1% 
respectively), contributing a combined 0.7 pp to 
headline inflation in the euro area. After an 
initially muted impact, HICP food prices have 
more recently been strongly affected by the 
growth in international agricultural commodity 
prices over the last year. While these commodity 
prices have now begun to fall, and are expected 
to do so throughout next year, continuing base 
effects and further possible lagged effects will 
continue to affect HICP food price over the next 
few months. 
In addition to the direct effects of commodity 
price increases, euro-area inflation over the 
coming months may be affected by likely future 
indirect effects on other sectors, persistently 
strong inflation in services and increased inflation 
expectations. There is also a risk of second-
round effects. 
Monetary and financial conditions  
The financial market tensions since July/August 
have led to a moderate downward revision in 
growth prospects in the euro area but have 
greatly increased the level of uncertainty 
surrounding the economic outlook. This has led 
the ECB to keep interest rates unchanged since 
the summer, contrary to what was expected until 
July, even though inflation has been on the rise 
and the ECB has pointed out that upside risks to 
price stability still remain. Currently, interest rate 
expectations as derived from financial market 
prices suggest that the most likely scenario is that 
the ECB will stay on hold in the coming months.  
Graph 7: Euro-area money market 
(in % ;  1 Jan 2007 to 30 Nov 2007) 
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Source: Commission services 
However, even with stable policy interest rates 
since June, monetary conditions in the euro area 
have become tighter, for three reasons.  
First, the financial turmoil has led to a significant 
reappraisal of credit risks, reflected in higher 
interbank interest rate spreads. Banks are holding 
on to their cash balances and useing the deposit 
facility of the ECB rather than lending to other 
banks. In the midst of the turmoil, the 3-month 
Euribor was as high as 4.80%, leading to a spread 
versus the 3-month German treasury bill of 
around 100 bps.3 Following a temporary 
improvement in money market conditions, 
renewed credit concerns became apparent in 
November in the wake of banks signalling 
possible higher than expected write-downs due 
to credit losses related to the US sub-prime crisis. 
Presently, the 3-month Euribor is above 4.80% 
and the spread versus German Treasury bill again 
close to 100 bps.  
                                                     
3  The difference between 3-month EURIBOR and 3-
month German Treasury bill (the so-called TED spread) 
is a measure of liquidity that can also be used as an 
indicator of credit risk. This is because German Treasury- 
bills are considered risk-free while the rate associated with 
the EURIBOR reflects the credit risk of non-government 
borrowers. The average spread for the difference between 
the 3-month EURIBOR and 3-month German Treasury 
bill has in the past been around 20 bps. The acronym 
comes from 'T-Bill' and 'ED' - the ticker symbol for the 
Eurodollar futures contract. 
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Box 2: China's trade surplus and renminbi exchange rate 
A soaring trade surplus  
China is the world's third largest world exporter after the US and Germany and the third largest trading partner of 
the euro area in terms of its combined share of exports and imports. From 2000 to 2006, bilateral trade between the 
euro area and China increased by 167% (overall euro-area trade increased by 37%). China is running a high and 
increasing trade surplus. According to Chinese statistics, its global trade surplus has increased from 35 bn US dollar 
in 2000 to USD 178 bn in 2006, and again to USD 214 bn in the first ten months of 2007 alone. China also has the 
largest bilateral trade surplus with the euro area.  
The Chinese trade surplus is a major element of global current account imbalances. As a result of IMF-led 
multilateral consultations(1) to address these imbalances, the Chinese authorities committed to a number of reforms 
including structural measures to rebalance growth towards private consumption and a flexibilisation of the renminbi 
exchange rate. Together with structural weaknesses which have led to excessive domestic savings, the undervaluation 
of the renminbi is widely seen as a key driver of China's large trade surplus.  
 
Renminbi against euro and USD 
(daily values) 
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In June 2005, China reformed its exchange rate policy, revaluating the renminbi by 2.1% and formally abandoning its 
peg to the US dollar in favour of a peg to a basket of currencies. Since then, the renminbi has gradually appreciated 
against the US dollar, by a cumulative 10.6% until early December 2007. The very regular pace of its development 
against the dollar (as opposed to the euro, see left panel of the graph) suggests that the US dollar ha de facto remained 
the main reference for the renminbi exchange rate. However, as the dollar depreciated significantly over the same 
period, the renminbi hardly appreciated in effective terms, and depreciated by 9.4% against the euro. This has led to 
calls by the G7 for China 'to allow an accelerated appreciation of its effective exchange rate'.(2) 
The structure of China's external trade: does the exchange rate affect exports?  
China's role as a processing hub, it has been argued, would result in a very low exchange rate elasticity for China's 
exports. An appreciation of the renminbi would make intermediate goods imported from the East Asian region 
cheaper, allowing Chinese exporters to reduce their prices and thus offset the nominal appreciation. However, the 
structure of China's production and exports has been changing fast in recent years.(3) In particular, more inputs into 
export goods are now produced domestically, as witnessed by the stabilisation of China's trade deficit with the rest of 
Asia at a time when its exports to the US and the euro area have soared. Moreover, the technology content of 
China's exports has increased and there are indications that this has made them more price-sensitive. Trade 
elasticities are therefore probably higher than estimates based on historical data suggest.(4) 
A domestic policy dilemma  
Some observers(5) have argued that a strategy of export-led growth with an artificially low exchange rate is a 
sustainable and indeed optimal development strategy for China. However, the sustainability of this strategy now 
seems to be threatened by domestic developments even more than by external constraints (mostly related to 
concerns about the sustainability of the corresponding US deficit). Large-scale intervention in the foreign exchange 
market is increasingly posing problems for the pursuit of China's domestic policy goals. China's foreign exchange 
reserves now amount to USD 1.4 trillion, or 85% of GDP, and have recently been increasing by an average of 2 
billion US dollar per day. In an attempt to sterilise the liquidity created by the interventions, the People's Bank of 
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China has increased minimum reserve requirements nine times in 2007 so far and has issued bills worth 2.6 trillion 
renminbi in the first half of the year. The massive absorption of central bank bills by the banking sector creates 
opportunity costs and stands in the way of asset diversification. Despite the sterilisation efforts, liquidity is increasing 
and is likely to be fuelling the emergence of asset price bubbles – the Shanghai stock index has soared by 400% since 
2006 – and inflation.(6) The authorities are applying administrative restrictions to curb rapid credit growth, which is 
often directed to already overheating sectors of the economy. An appreciation would reduce the need to intervene 
and free the central bank to pursue its domestic monetary objectives. At the same time, increasing expectations of 
renminbi appreciation are likely to be an important determinant of the latest inflows of portfolio investment.(7)  
A potential broader impact of renminbi appreciation 
China remains an important destination for exports from other East Asian countries, with which it also competes for 
market shares in third countries. Many countries in the region have sizeable current account surpluses and 
undervalued exchange rates. In 2007, the founding members of ASEAN (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Singapore) are expected to have a combined current account surplus of 7.6% of GDP, and Japan a 
surplus of 4.5%. Since June 2005 (i.e. the month before China's initial exchange rate policy adjustment), the 
Malaysian ringgit and the Singapore dollar continued to track the renminbi closely. The Korean won also remained in 
a range of +/- 5% to the renminbi, while the yen, the Indonesian rupiah and the Hong Kong dollar depreciated 
substantially. The Thai baht and the Philippine peso appreciated against both the renminbi and the euro.  
Effective renminbi appreciation would allow more of the countries in the region to let their currencies appreciate 
without fear of losing exports. Overall, an effective appreciation of East Asian currencies would contribute to an 
orderly reduction of global current account imbalances and would alleviate pressures on the bilateral exchange rate of 
the US dollar against the euro. 
Notes 
(1) These consultations took place between the summer of 2006 and the spring of 2007 and involved the US (as the main deficit 
country), China, Japan and Saudi Arabia for the main surplus countries and the euro area as a major global player, despite its 
overall balanced current account. 
(2) Statement by G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington D.C., 19 October 2007. 
(3) Aziz, J. and Z. Li (2007), 'China's Changing Trade Elasticities', IMF Working Paper WP/07/266. 
(4) Cui, L. and M. Syed (2007), 'Is China Changing its Stripes? The Shifting Structure of China’s External Trade and its 
Implications', paper presented at the conference 'Global Implications of China's Trade, Investment and Growth', 6 April, 
Washington D.C 
(5) Dooley,P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2004),'The revived Bretton Woods System', International Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 9(4), pp 307-313. 
(6) Price-earnings ratios increased somewhat less, as firms experienced strong profit growth.   
(7) McKinnon  warned about the destabilising potential of such a combination of appreciation expectations and speculative capital 
inflows. McKinnon, R (2006), 'China's Exchange Rate Trap: Japan Redux?', American Economic Review 96(2), pp  427-431
Second, while government bond yields in the 
euro area and the US have fallen since August – 
mostly driven by US economic news but also due 
to investors looking for a 'safe haven'– the cost 
of debt financing for companies has not 
declined, as corporate spreads and bank-lending 
standards have tightened. 
Third, the euro's has significantly appreciated 
further during the autumn. The euro reached 
close to USD 1.50 on 23 November and now 
stands at USD 1.47, 8% higher than three 
months ago. It has appreciated by 5.3% against 
the pound sterling in the past three months, 
coming close to the record high of 0.724 set in 
May 2003. The financial turmoil has also caused 
an unwinding of carry trade positions. After a 
strong initial appreciation in July and August, the 
yen exchange rate has remained very volatile in 
the past three months, within a range of 157-168 
to the euro.  
In comparison with its average for 2006, the euro 
has appreciated 6.3% in nominal effective terms, 
3.4 pp of which occurred in the past three 
months. The nominal effective depreciation of 
the US dollar has also become steeper, gaining 
4.5% in the past three months, and the Chinese 
renminbi depreciated 1.5% in effective terms 
over the same period.  
The euro's strength has been largely due to the 
developments in fundamental variables – namely 
a stronger growth outlook for 2008 in the euro 
area than in the US or Japan and expectations of 
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a closing interest rate gap with the US. More 
specifically, the Fed lowered its interest rates 
three times during the autumn, bringing down 
the Fed funds target to 4.25%.  
Graph 8: Euro exchange rates 
(2 Jan 2007 to 27 Nov 2007) 
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Source: Commission services 
However, significant further effective 
appreciation could bring the euro outside the 
range that can be explained by the development 
of fundamentals. The impact of the strong euro 
on euro-area exports, which has been limited so 
far, would then probably be felt more strongly. It 
is therefore even more important at the current 
juncture that the exchange rate impact of the 
rebalancing of global imbalances is spread more 
evenly across the main world regions and 
countries. In particular, Asian economies with 
large current account surpluses should contribute 
to this process through an appreciation of their 
currencies. For instance, the Chinese renminbi 
should be allowed to appreciate in effective 
terms. This would increase the room for 
manoeuvre of the monetary policy authorities, 
and would also facilitate the appreciation of the 
currencies of other East Asian economies with 
large current account surpluses (see Box 2). 
Graph 9: NEER against 41 parties 
(Index 2 Jan 2006 =100; 2 Jan 2006 to 30 Nov 2007) 
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Box 3: The upcoming euro-area enlargement to Cyprus and Malta 
 
One year after Slovenia, on 1 January 2008, Cyprus and Malta will become the next countries of the ten Member 
States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 to enter the euro area. Euro notes and coins will be issued by these 
countries at the same time that they adopt the euro. The conversion rates are set at 0.4293 Maltese lira and at 
0.585274 Cyprus pound to the euro, the current central rates of these currencies within the ERM II exchange rate 
mechanism.  
Cyprus' and Malta's entry into the euro area is the result of a successful process of convergence towards the euro 
area, accompanied by stability-oriented policies and structural reforms. Although at times volatile, inflation in the 
two countries has traditionally been moderate and in recent years it has been very close to the euro-area average, 
standing at 2.2% in Cyprus and 2.6% in Malta in 2006. Interest rate convergence has largely been achieved. In both 
countries, the short-term interest rate differential vis-à-vis the euro has declined sharply after their ERM II accession. 
Since August 2006, it has almost vanished in Cyprus, while it has been below 50 basis points in Malta. In addition, 
spreads for long-term interest rates have narrowed substantially in both countries in the last two years and, since 
January 2007, have been below 30 basis points in Cyprus and close to 40 basis points in Malta. General government 
deficits have declined in recent years in both countries (and now stand at 1.2% of GDP in Cyprus and 2.5% of GDP 
in Malta in 2006), as has the public debt as a share of GDP (which amounted to 65.2% in Cyprus and 64.7% in Malta 
in 2006). 
The GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) of Cyprus and Malta reached respectively 77.3% and 
69.1% of the euro-area level in 2006, while consumer price levels were respectively 86.7% and 70.9% of the euro-
area average. Cyprus has experienced high GDP growth in the last decade. Annual average growth was slightly below 
4% in the period 2004-2006 and strong growth is expected to continue in 2007 and 2008. In Malta, real GDP growth 
oscillated around zero between 2001 and 2004. As a result, the process of real convergence towards the euro-area 
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decelerated in those years. Real GDP growth picked up strongly in 2005 and 2006 and, according to the Commission 
Autumn 2007 Forecasts, is expected to continue at close to 3% in 2007 and 2008. In both countries, further progress 
is however needed in order to increase labour productivity, which is still below the euro-area average. While the 
labour market situation in Cyprus compares well vis-à-vis the euro area, with an average unemployment rate of 4.6% 
in 2006 (8.2% for euro-area average) and a high employment rate (69.6% compared to 64.6% in the euro area), the 
picture is less rosy in Malta. The Maltese employment rate is relatively low (at 54.8%), notably for women and older 
persons, and unemployment rate is relatively high (7.3%), although still below the euro-area average. In both 
countries, the current account has been in deficit over the last decade, with a trade deficit only partially compensated 
for by a sizeable surplus in services trade, reflecting the competitive advantages of these two islands in tourism, 
financial and businesses services.  
 
Recent macroeconomic performance, Cyprus and Malta   
(in %) 
Cyprus Malta  
2004 2005 2006 2007 (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1)
GDP growth 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.8 0.1 2.5 2.6 3.1 
Inflation 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 0.8 
Current account deficit (%of GDP) -5.0 -5.6 -5.9 -6.0 -6.0 -8.8 -6.7 -3.8 
Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -2.4 -1.2 -1.0 -4.9 -3.1 -2.5 -1.8
(1) European Commission Autumn 2007 Forecasts;  
Source: Commission services.  
 
Cyprus' and Malta's convergence process has been accompanied by a sustained increase in trade and financial 
integration with the euro area. Cyprus and Malta are both small, open economies which are highly integrated in terms 
of trade and FDI with the euro area. Trade with the euro area represents 51% of total trade for Cyprus and 48% for 
Malta. In addition, a large share of FDI comes from the euro area (34% for Cyprus and 55% in Malta in 2005).(*) 
Reflecting their history as regional financial centres, the Cypriot and Maltese financial systems are also substantially 
interlinked with the financial systems of the euro area. In both countries, the financial sector is well developed in 
relation to their stage of economic development, with a predominant banking sector but with other financial 
intermediates also developing.  
 
Cyprus and Malta will become the two smallest economies in the euro area, contributing only 0.17% and 0.06% 
respectively to euro-area GDP, and 0.24% and 0.13% to its population. Their membership of the monetary union 
will bring additional opportunities for their citizens and businesses. However, it will be essential that their economic 
policies continue to be geared towards preserving macroeconomic stability and competitiveness. In particular, further 
improvement in the functioning of product and labour markets are needed to foster productivity growth and 
facilitate the restructuring towards more innovation-driven activities. This would prevent competitiveness strains as 
income further catches up with EU average levels and help to maintain a sustainable current account balance. While 
this is a challenge in both countries, it is more acute in Malta, where labour productivity and the employment rate 
stand well below the euro-area average and the unemployment rate is still high. In addition, in both countries, a 
prudent fiscal stance aimed at avoiding the build-up of excessive demand pressures and wage developments in line 
with productivity gains are needed. Malta, in particular, will have to continue its fiscal consolidation efforts to reduce 
the still high fiscal deficit.  
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2.  The decline of inflation volatility 
in the euro area 
This section provides a broad analytical review of 
developments in inflation volatility in the euro 
area. It first compares the area's inflation 
performance since the launch of Stage III of 
EMU with previous periods and with the other 
main industrialised countries. It then discusses 
the main explanatory factors for the observed 
developments in inflation volatility. 
The inflation performance since the 
inception of the euro 
Table 3 gives an overall characterisation of 
inflation performance during current and 
previous decades. The euro area has registered a 
clear improvement in terms of the level of 
inflation over the last four decades. While in the 
1970s average inflation in the euro area more 
than doubled, to over 9%, compared to the 
1960s, as a consequence of the two oil price 
shocks and the policy responses to them, it has 
since declined to 2% in the current decade.  
Table 3: Inflation performance by decade: euro 
area (in%) 
 
Average 
inflation 
Standard 
deviat. of 
inflation 
Maximum 
inflation 
Date of 
max. 
inflation
1960s 3.7 0.9 5.1 1963 
1970s 9.3 2.8 13.6 1974 
1980s 7.5 3.8 12.8 1980 
1990s 2.8 1.2 5.0 1990 
2000s(1) 2.0 0.3 2.4 2001 
(1) Corresponds to the period since the start of Stage III of 
EMU, of which the last 2 years are forecast values. 
Source: Commission services 
 
It is noteworthy that a sizable part of the decline 
in inflation occurred in the 1990s, reflecting the 
efforts made by Member States to meet the 
Maastricht criteria and be part of the first wave 
to adopt the euro. Key among these efforts was 
an improvement in monetary policy making, 
which included granting independence to 
national central banks, introducing some forms 
of inflation targeting and paying more attention 
to credibility issues and expectations. Indeed, the 
evidence from the 1990s indicates that greater 
central bank independence and the adoption of 
inflation targets have helped bringing down both 
inflation and its volatility.4 
Average inflation declined even further in the 
current decade, to stand at 2%, the lowest rate in 
the last 50 years. Remarkably, this has been 
achieved in spite of a series of severe inflationary 
shocks hitting the euro-area countries from the 
start, including surges in oil prices, swings in the 
euro exchange rate, temporary rises in food 
prices and increases in indirect taxes and 
administered prices in several Member States.  
Even more impressive than the performance of 
average inflation is that of inflation volatility. 
Using the standard deviation in each decade to 
gauge inflation volatility, the current decade 
displays more stable inflation than any other 
decade in the last 50 years. As can be seen in the 
second column of table 3, the standard deviation 
of inflation peaked in the 1980s, at close to 4 pp. 
In the 1990s, when the institutional arrangements 
for participation in Stage III of EMU were put in 
place, the standard deviation of inflation declined 
to nearly one fourth of that of the preceding 
decade. In the last period, the volatility of 
inflation was yet again reduced to one fourth of 
that of the preceding decade. As a result, the 
volatility of inflation in the last decade is also 
markedly lower than in the 1960s, the next-best 
decade for low inflation volatility. 
Another way to look at the progress in terms of 
inflation performance is to examine how bad 
inflation has been at its worst in each period. The 
third column in table 3 gives the highest annual 
average inflation rate recorded in each decade 
and the fourth column the year in which this 
occurred. By this measure, inflation performance 
in the 1990s was not markedly different from 
that of the 1960s, when the Bretton Woods 
system sheltered economies from exchange rate 
movements. However, the most recent period 
stands out again with a maximum level of 
inflation that is half the level of the 1960s and 
1990s.  
                                                     
4  Eijffinger, S.C.W. and de Haan, J. (1996) 'The Political 
Economy of Central Bank Independence', Princeton 
University: Special Papers in International Economics, 
N°19 (May); Woodford M. (2004), 'Inflation targeting and 
optimal monetary policy', Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, July/August; (86)4, pp.15-41. 
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The decline of inflation volatility in euro-area 
Member States 
Within the euro area, three groups of countries 
can be identified with noticeable differences in 
the timing and scope of reductions of inflation 
volatility. In the first group, the standard 
deviations of inflation in the last five decades 
hardly went above 2 pp (DE, AT and NL). A 
second group registered average standard 
deviations of twice that level (BE, FR and LU). 
The third group includes the countries where 
inflation was the most volatile with standard 
deviations in excess of 4 pp (IE, EL, ES, IT, PT 
and FI). That group also registered the largest 
falls in both inflation volatility and the inflation 
level over the last two decades. 
To gain more insight into the time profile of 
changes in inflation volatility, Graph 10 shows 
the evolution of rolling 5-year standard 
deviations for all euro-area Member States. The 
chart shows that countries in the first group (DE, 
AT and NL) embarked on a relatively mild trend 
decline of inflation volatility already in the early 
1980s. For the countries in the second group 
(BE, FR and LU) the decline took place in the 
late 1980s. Four countries of the third group (ES, 
EL, IT and FI) also show a trend decline in 
volatility since the early 1980s, although from 
considerably higher levels, while the two 
remaining countries in this group (IE and PT) 
followed suit in the late 1980s. 
Interestingly, a noticeable break in the series for 
inflation volatility can be observed in the 1990s 
for most countries. The countries in the first 
group recorded a sustained drop of about 25% in 
the volatility of inflation in the 1990s, with 
standard deviations generally below 1 pp since 
then. The break is more clearly noticeable for 
countries in the second group, which saw a 
decline in volatility of some 70% in the 1990s, 
Graph 10: Inflation volatility, euro-area Member States   
(Standard deviations; 5 years rolling, annual data)  (1) 
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(1) Slovenia is not shown due to the relatively short historical series available for that country. 
Sources: Commission services. 
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with standard deviations also durably below 1 pp 
since then. A noticeable break can also be 
observed in the 1990s for some countries in the 
third group, albeit with inflation remaining twice 
as volatile as in the former groups (IE, ES, IT 
and FI). The remaining countries (EL and PT) 
reached similarly low levels of inflation volatility 
only in the last 10 years. 
In the current decade, most countries have 
registered further substantial reductions in 
inflation volatility, to reach standard deviations 
of around ½ pp for the decade. This includes 
even countries that had a history of relatively low 
and stable inflation. Germany, in particular, 
recorded a 50% reduction in the standard 
deviation of inflation, from 1 pp in the 1990s to 
½ pp in the last ten years. This is a remarkable 
achievement, as it means that the last decade 
corresponds to a period with unprecedented low 
inflation volatility since the 1960s for all Member 
States, except Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Although remaining low by historical standards, 
the standard deviation of inflation in these two 
countries rose by about 50% in the last decade 
compared to the 1990s.  
The euro-area experience in an international 
perspective  
Table 4 presents a synthetic view of inflation 
performance in the US and in two non-euro-area 
EU Member States, the UK and Sweden. These 
countries underwent the same overall patterns as 
those described for the euro area. Average 
inflation was highest in the 1970s. Inflation 
declined thereafter, with the last decade showing 
the lowest levels of the last 50 years in the UK 
and Sweden, while in the US the 1960s remains 
the decade with lowest average inflation. 
However, in all three countries the last decade is 
unambiguously the one with the lowest inflation 
volatility.  
In terms of timing, the US embarked on a trend 
decline in volatility in the second half of the 
1980s. Several authors have pointed to major 
changes at the Federal Reserve, which were 
implemented during the tenure as chairman of 
Paul Volcker, as one of the main explanatory 
factors for the moderation of inflation volatility. 
In the pre-Volcker period (i.e. pre-1979), 
monetary policy seemed to have adopted an 
accommodative stance, responding less than one-
for-one to changes in inflation.5 According to 
these authors, by being more aggressive in the 
post-1979 period US monetary policy managed 
to reduce and stabilise inflation and expected 
inflation. By the first half of the 1990s, standard 
deviations were typically around 1 pp. and 
dropped further in the following decade.  
 
Table 4: Inflation performance by decade: UK, 
SE and US (in %) 
 Average 
inflation 
Standard 
deviat. of 
inflation 
Maximum 
inflation 
Date of 
max. 
inflation 
UK     
1960s 3.8 1.0 5.4 1969
1970s 12.5 5.3 24.2 1975
1980s 7.4 4.5 18.0 1980
1990s 3.9 2.6 9.5 1990
2000s(1) 2.7 0.5 2.4 2007
     
SE     
1960s 3.7 1.3 6.3 1966
1970s 8.6 1.8 11.4 1977
1980s 7.9 3.1 13.6 1980
1990s 3.5 3.6 10.5 1990
2000s(1) 1.4 0.7 2.7 2001
     
US     
1960s 2.4 1.5 5.4 1969
1970s 7.1 2.5 11.3 1979
1980s 5.5 3.6 13.5 1980
1990s 3.1 1.1 5.4 1990
2000s(1) 2.6 0.6 3.4 2000
(1) Corresponds to the period since the start of Stage III of 
EMU, of which the last 2 years are forecast values 
Source: Commission services 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 See for instance, Clarida, R., J. Galí. and M. Gertler (2000), 
'Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: 
evidence and some theory', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol.115, N°1, pp.147-80. However, Gordon (2005) argues 
that monetary policy reactions were very similar during 
the Greenspan and the pre-Volcker years. Gordon, R. 
(2005), 'What caused the decline in business cycle 
volatility', NBER Working Paper No. 11777. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 19 - 
The UK has followed a pattern relatively similar 
to that of the US although volatility rebounded 
temporarily in the late 1980s early 1990s. Sweden 
experienced a marked rise in volatility in the late 
1980s early 1990s but lower volatility than the US 
and the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Barrel and Davis (2005) argue that UK monetary 
policy improved markedly in 1993 when it 
became more open and less influenced by short-
term political needs.6 The independence of the 
Bank of England in 1997 confirmed the policy 
direction. In the case of Sweden, there is 
evidence that the move of the Riksbank to 
inflation targeting in 1995 and the increased 
independence gained later in the decade greatly 
improved monetary performance. Already by the 
end of that decade, both the UK and Sweden 
entered a period of remarkably low inflation 
volatility, with standard deviations similar to 
those of the US, though still somewhat higher 
than in the euro area.  
Graph 11: Inflation volatility: euro area, UK, SE and US 
(Standard deviations; 5 years rolling, annual data) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Thus, it is not only the euro area that has seen 
sustained and substantial declines in the level and 
volatility of inflation since the 1990s. This 
suggests that, while certainly important, changes 
in the macroeconomic policy framework related 
to Stage III of EMU might not be the only 
explanatory factor behind the remarkable 
improvement in inflation performance over the 
last two decades. An alternative interpretation is 
that many of the institutional changes that matter 
for achieving an environment of low and stable 
inflation, which have been embedded in the 
                                                     
6  Barrel, R. and P. Davis (2005), 'Policy Design and 
Macroeconomic Stability in Europe', National Institute 
Economic Review, N°19, January, pp.94-105. 
EMU policy framework in the early 1990s, also 
took place in non-euro-area countries. These 
changes include granting independence to the 
central bank, giving it an explicit and clear 
mandate for achieving price stability, and wide 
recognition by policy makers and the public at 
large that price stability is a key policy objective. 
Exploring possible factors behind the decline 
of inflation volatility 
This section explores some of the possible 
factors that may have played an important role in 
explaining the decline in inflation volatility. 
Graph 12 presents a scatter plot of average 
inflation and its standard deviation for euro-area 
Member States. The chart also includes data for 
the countries that served as benchmarks for a 
comparison of the inflation performance of the 
euro area, namely Sweden, the UK and the US. A 
strong positive correlation can be observed 
between the level and the standard deviation of 
inflation over the whole sample period. In 
addition, examining the data by decade shows 
that in nearly every country, periods of low 
inflation were associated with more stable 
inflation, while periods of higher inflation went 
together with increased volatility of inflation.  
Graph 12: Inflation level and volatility: euro area, UK, 
SE and US  
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Source: Commission services. 
The fact that the data reveals a positive link 
between the level of inflation and its volatility 
lends support to the hypothesis that improved 
monetary policy has played a role. Over the last 
two decades, there has been a conscious and 
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systematic move away from unpredictable 
monetary policy which tends to generate price 
surprises towards stabilising the economy.7 This 
has gone hand in hand with a better 
understanding of the importance of expectations 
and ensuring that monetary policy is credible.8 By 
committing credibly to achieving an inflation 
objective/target that is equivalent to price 
stability, monetary policy has managed to lower 
not only the level but also the volatility of 
inflation.9 With a credible commitment to price 
stability, economic agents do not have to change 
their expected inflation in the face of an adverse 
inflation shock.  
Graph 13: Volatility of growth in import prices, euro 
area, UK, SE and US  
(Standard deviations; 5 years rolling, annual data) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
7  Research has highlighted the high level of predictability of 
the ECB's monetary policy. See for instance Perez-
Quiros, G. and J. Sicilia (2002), 'Is the European  Central 
Bank (and the United States Federal Reserve) 
predictable?', Working Paper No. 192, ECB; or 
Wilhelmsen, B.R. and A. Zaghini (2005), 'Monetary policy 
predictability in the euro area – An international 
comparison', Working Paper No. 504, ECB. 
8  See for instance Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1977), 
'Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal 
plans', Journal of Political Economy, (86)3: 473-492.  
Barro, R. J. and D. Gordon (1983), 'A positive theory of 
monetary policy in a natural rate model', Journal of Political 
Economy, 91(2): 586-610. 
9  The countries which registered the highest rates of 
inflation in the 1970s also registered the highest levels of 
volatility. It is now generally admitted that the high 
inflation prevailing at the time reflected not only strong 
supply shocks but also inefficient monetary policies. The 
strong correlation between inflation and inflation 
volatility across both countries and time suggests that 
inefficient monetary policy was responsible not only for 
high inflation but also for high volatility. 
Among other factors that could explain the 
reduced volatility of inflation is lower volatility in 
the main variables that traditionally drive the 
inflation process, which, of course, could also 
translate the effect of an improved policy 
framework. Examining first inflationary impulses 
from the external side, Graph 13 shows that the 
volatility of import prices declined markedly in 
the last three decades across the main 
industrialised countries. Import price inflation 
volatility was very low in the 1960s, reflecting the 
predominance of fixed exchange rate regimes at 
the time. In the 1970s, with the break-up of 
Bretton Woods and the oil price shocks, the 
volatility of import price inflation surged. It then 
fell back in the 1980s, while remaining 
considerably higher than in the 1960s. Further 
declines have been registered in the last two 
decades.  
This evidence suggests that reduced volatility in 
world prices has contributed to the decline in the 
volatility of CPI inflation. An additional 
dimension, in the case of euro-area Member 
States, has been the disappearance of nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations within the area. There 
is indeed evidence that, despite large swings in 
the external value of the euro, the volatility of 
Member States' nominal effective exchange rates 
has remained relatively low since the launch of 
the euro, at least in comparison with the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Additionally, the literature on import prices 
provides evidence suggesting that the degree of 
pass-through to domestic inflation may have 
declined in advanced countries in recent years, 
reflecting, for instance, the increased use of 
pricing-to-market strategies.10 This would imply a 
diminished role for import price volatility in 
explaining the volatility of domestic inflation. 
Moreover, there is also an issue of endogeneity 
here. An international environment characterised 
                                                     
10  See for instance Taylor (2000) who argues that in a low 
inflation environment the degree of pass-through is likely 
to be lower. Taylor, J.B. (2000), 'Low inflation, pass-
through, and the pricing power of frms' European Economic 
Review, 44, pp. 1389-1408. See Faruquee (2006) for a 
recent finding of very low estimated short-run pass-
through to import, wholesale and retail prices in the euro 
area. Faruqee, H. (2006), 'Exchange rate pass-through in 
the euro area', IMF Staff Papers, 53(1): 63-88. 
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by lower and less volatile inflation would be also 
conducive to lower import price volatility.  
Graph 14: Volatility of growth in unit labour costs, euro 
area, UK, SE and US  
(Standard deviations; 5 years rolling, annual data) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
EA-12 UK US SE  
Source: Commission services. 
Turning to domestic determinants of inflation, 
Graph 14 displays the development of the 
volatility of growth in unit labour costs (ULCs) 
since the 1960s for the same group of countries. 
The volatility of ULC growth in the euro area 
was fairly low in the 1960s. It increased sharply in 
the 1970s, declined in the 1980s, increased 
somewhat again in the early 1990s and has been 
on a broad downward trend since. A broadly 
similar pattern can be observed in the other 
countries except in the US which experienced its 
largest rise in volatility in the early 1980s.  
These developments in ULCs can mostly be 
traced back to similar developments in the 
volatility of wages. In contrast, data shows that 
fluctuations in labour productivity only played a 
significant role in the 1970s and 1980s and even 
then the volatility of growth in productivity was 
smaller than that of wages (except in the US). 
This suggests that reduced productivity shocks 
have contributed to the decline in inflation 
volatility although more modestly than wages. 
However, while lower wage growth volatility has 
clearly facilitated the decline in inflation volatility, 
it is difficult to say to what extent this is the 
result of an autonomous development or a 
response to better macroeconomic policies and 
the corresponding changes in expectations. 
A final link to explore is the one between 
inflation volatility and the volatility of GDP 
growth.11 From a period of low growth volatility 
in the 1960s, the following decade saw a marked 
rise in output growth volatility in the euro area as 
well as in the US. While this development was 
reversed in the 1980s, there was a temporary 
resurgence of volatility (peaking at a much lower 
level than in the 1970s-80s) in the first half of the 
1990s and then again, to a lesser degree, in the 
early 2000s. The overall level of volatility has 
remained quite low in the last decade. 
There is a large and growing body of literature 
examining the reasons behind the observed 
marked decline in growth volatility, particularly in 
US, which is often labelled the 'Great 
Moderation'. Although no consensus has yet 
been reached on the proximate causes, it is clear 
that there has been a positive correlation between 
the paths of inflation volatility and growth 
volatility over the last decades. This suggests that 
improvements in monetary policy responses to 
shocks may have contributed to the decline in 
the volatility of both inflation and growth. 
However, there are also other salient candidate 
explanations for the reduced volatility of inflation 
and growth, namely structural changes in the 
economy (including reduced energy intensity of 
production, more intense product market 
competition and greater financial market 
integration), but also simply 'good luck', in the 
sense of fewer or smaller shocks to the economy. 
Although these factors have likely all played a 
role, disentangling their respective contribution is 
not easy. Some recent studies for the US have 
tended to give a prominent role to economic 
shocks and 'good luck'. Stock and Watson (2003), 
for instance, find that although improved 
monetary policy played a key role in getting 
inflation under control, it only made a modest 
contribution to the moderation of output 
volatility in the US.12 Gordon (2005) goes one 
step further and ascribes most of the decline in 
both growth and inflation volatility in the US to 
                                                     
11  For an assessment of the volatility of output growth in 
the euro area, see Focus Section on 'The reduced volatility 
of output growth in the euro area', Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, Vol. 6, No 1 (2007) . 
12  Stock, J. H., and M. W. Watson, (2003), 'Has the business 
cycle changed? Evidence and explanations', in Monetary 
Policy and Uncertainty, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, pp 9 – 56. 
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reduced shocks. However, other researchers such 
as Cecchetti et al. (2006) conclude that better 
monetary policy has made a substantial 
contribution to lower output volatility and 
inflation volatility in the US as well as a large 
number of OECD countries.13   
Finally, two arguments should be borne in mind 
when comparing developments in inflation 
volatility in the euro area and the US. First, in 
several Member States, inflation peaked in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s at much higher levels 
than in the US, which suggests that there was 
more scope for improvements in the conduct of 
monetary policy in these countries than in the 
US. Second, a stark difference between the US 
and the euro area is that there was no unexpected 
acceleration of productivity in Europe in the 
1990s. Because it was partly unexpected, the 
pick-up of US productivity has contributed to 
dampen inflation pressures across the Atlantic 
and can therefore be considered as a key 
ingredient of the good luck hypothesis in this 
country.  
Concluding remarks 
The main findings of this section are the 
following:  
(1) The inflation performance in the euro area 
since the launch of the euro has been 
exceptionally good, yielding the lowest inflation 
rates in the last 5 decades as well as a marked 
reduction of inflation volatility. Remarkably, this 
has occurred despite a series of adverse shocks.  
(2) While further improvements have occurred 
since the beginning of Stage III of EMU, the 
most significant changes took place in general in 
the late 1980s and the decade of the 1990s. The 
aggregate euro-area picture, however, conceals 
some heterogeneity among Member States 
regarding the timing and scope of the 
improvement in inflation performance.  
(3) A preliminary exploration of the possible 
explanatory factors behind the decline of 
                                                     
13  Cecchetti, S. G., A. Flores-Lagunes and S. Krause (2006), 
'Assessing the sources of changes in the volatility of real 
growth', NBER Working Papers 11946, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
inflation volatility and the related developments 
in output volatility points to the role of inflation 
expectations and improved credibility of 
monetary policy – reflecting strengthened policy 
frameworks – in bringing about such 
developments.  
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3. The international role of the euro 
The euro has firmly established itself as the 
second most important international currency 
after the US dollar. In many key functions, the 
euro surpasses the role of the Deutsche mark, 
but it has not displaced the US dollar as the 
world's most dominant currency. 
An international currency is used outside its 
home country as a unit of account, medium of 
exchange and store of value. Table 5 provides a 
simple decomposition of the various functions of 
an international currency, distinguishing between 
private and public sector usage. In practice, 
however, there are close relationships and 
interactions between the different functions.  
The euro as a unit of account 
In the private sector, the unit-of-account role is 
linked to the currency choice for invoicing of 
international trade and quotation in international 
commodities markets. The euro area is one of 
the most important trading blocs in the world. 
Consequently, the euro is often used to invoice 
and settle14 international trade transactions 
between euro-area countries and third countries. 
The use of the euro as a trade-invoicing currency 
by euro-area countries has risen markedly since 
2000 and, in the majority of euro-area countries 
for which data are available, the share of euro-
denominated merchandise exports is above 50 
per cent. A notable feature of the use of the euro 
in international trade is the strong regional 
concentration in countries and regions 
neighbouring the euro area. For instance, for 
non-euro-area EU Member States and EU 
candidate countries, the euro's share in invoicing 
and settlement of trade exceeds their share of 
trade with the euro area. In contrast, outside the 
euro-area's neighbourhood, the use of the euro in 
invoicing and settlement of trade with the euro 
area is much less prominent.  
In the oil and other international commodity 
markets, the US dollar remains the standard 
currency for quotation, invoicing and 
settlement.15 While oil and other commodity 
                                                     
14 Settlement of trade is linked to the medium-of-exchange 
role of a currency. 
15  See ECB (2007), 'Review of the international role of the 
euro', June 2007. 
producers have from time to time considered 
denominating their goods in other currencies, e.g. 
in euro or in a basket of currencies,16 the US 
dollar has maintained its dominant position in 
this area. 
In official use, the unit-of-account role is linked 
to the choice of a reference or anchor currency in 
a country's exchange rate regime. The choice of 
anchor currency is particularly important for the 
internationalisation of a currency, because it has 
significant spillover effects on the use of the 
same currency in official foreign exchange 
reserves and in foreign exchange market 
interventions. The euro plays an important role 
as de jure anchor or reference currency in the 
managed exchange rate regimes of about 40 
countries. Most of these countries are 
geographically close to the euro area, or have 
special institutional arrangements with the EU, 
notably candidate countries, potential candidate 
countries and the countries of the CFA franc 
zone. Seven non-euro-area EU Member States 
are currently part of ERM II, one Member State 
is running a euro-based currency board and three 
others are operating either a peg to the euro or 
managed floats using the euro as a reference 
(Table 7). Russia’s currency is pegged to a trade-
weighted basket of currencies with a substantial 
weight (45%) of the euro.  
There is also some empirical evidence that 
indicates that the euro has an increasingly 
important gravitational pull on other currencies. 
Galati and Wooldridge (2006) consider actual co-
movements of the euro with other currencies.17 
They find that the Swiss franc, the Scandinavian 
currencies and the currencies of central and 
eastern Europe closely track the euro's daily 
movements vis-à-vis the US dollar. In particular, 
the currencies of central and eastern European 
countries have tended to co-move more closely 
with the euro over the past years than with the 
Deutsche mark during the pre-EMU period. The 
authors also find that the pound sterling now 
tracks about two thirds of the euro’s movements 
vis-à-vis the dollar, compared to around 50% 
                                                     
16  For a recent case, see 'Opec looks at switch to strong 
currency', Financial Times, 19 November 2007. 
17  Galati, G and P. Wooldridge (2006), 'The euro as a 
reserve currency: a challenge to the pre-eminence of the 
US dollar?', BIS Working Papers, No. 218. 
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with the mark in the late 1990s. Finally, the 
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand dollars – 
which have traditionally belonged to the US 
dollar pole – now seem to behave similarly to the 
pound sterling. The euro's gravitational role is 
also becoming more important for certain 
emerging market currencies, notably in South 
America. By contrast, emerging market 
currencies in Asia still follow movements of the 
US dollar quite closely. 
The euro as a medium of exchange  
In foreign exchange markets, private sector 
participants use an international currency as a 
medium of exchange. The most actively traded 
currencies in foreign exchange markets are those 
that are used as vehicle currencies, i.e. as a means 
to exchange one relatively illiquid currency into 
another. According to the latest triennial survey 
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
published in late 2007, the euro was the second 
most actively traded currency in foreign exchange 
markets worldwide, after the US dollar but ahead 
of the Japanese yen and the pound sterling.18 In 
spring 2007, the euro was involved in 37% of all 
foreign exchange transactions, compared to 86% 
for the US dollar (Table 6).19 The euro is traded 
predominantly against the US dollar in global 
markets. The euro/US dollar currency pair is the 
most actively traded pair in global foreign 
exchange markets, accounting for more than one 
quarter of global turnover. The combined market 
share of other currency pairs involving the euro 
is small, around 10% of global turnover, 
compared with more than 60% for the US dollar. 
This suggests that the use of the euro as a vehicle 
                                                     
18  BIS (2007), 'Triennial central bank survey of foreign 
exchange and derivatives market activity', September. 
19  Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, 
the sum of the percentage shares of all individual 
currencies totals 200% instead of 100%. 
currency in foreign exchange markets is still 
limited, partly because the US dollar's 
incumbency advantages are particularly strong in 
the foreign exchange vehicle function. 
Table 6: Currency distribution of foreign 
exchange market turnover  
(% shares of average daily turnover in April ) (1) 
 1992 1998 2001 2004 2007
US dollar 82.0 87.3 90.3 88.7 86.3 
Euro (2) 39.6 30.1 37.6 37.2 37.0 
Japanese yen 23.4 20.2 22.7 20.3 16.5 
Pound sterling 13.6 11.0 13.2 16.9 15.0 
(1) Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the 
sum of the percentage shares of individual currencies totals 
200% instead of 100%. 
(2) DEM before 1999 
Source: BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2007 
 
In official use, the medium-of-exchange function 
is related to monetary authorities' choice of 
intervention currency in foreign exchange 
markets. Countries using any form of peg or 
managed float regularly intervene in foreign 
exchange markets to keep their exchange rate in 
line with the chosen regime. The choice of 
anchor or reference currency influences the 
choice of intervention currency, although the 
liquidity and efficiency of the financial markets of 
the intervention currency can also be an 
important consideration. While most monetary 
authorities do not disclose the currency 
composition of interventions, there are 
indications that several non-euro-area Member 
States, countries operating a euro-based currency 
board, and countries in the EU neighbourhood 
area have used the euro as an intervention 
currency (ECB 2007).  
 
Table 5: Functions of an international currency 
Function Private Sector Public sector 
Unit of account Invoicing of international trade; quotation of international commodity prices; denomination of 
international financial transactions; parallel currency 
Anchor or reference currency in 
exchange rate regimes 
Medium of 
exchange 
Vehicle currency in the foreign exchange markets; 
settlement of international financial transactions; 
parallel currency 
Official interventions in the foreign 
exchange markets; official financial flows
Store of value Holding of international financial assets; parallel 
currency 
Foreign exchange reserve currency 
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The euro as a store of value 
In private use, the store-of-value function is 
linked to holdings of international financial 
assets. The euro has quickly established its role as 
a store of value in international financial markets. 
Euro-denominated debt securities now account 
for more than 47% of the outstanding stock of 
international bonds and notes, surpassing the 
share of the US dollar (see Graph 15).  
Graph 15: International bonds and notes by currency of 
issue (1) 
(Amounts outstanding, in % of total, at current exchange 
rates; Dec 93 to Jun 07)  
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(1) Broad measure (includes home-currency issuance if targeted to 
the international market). 
 Source: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2007, Table 13B. 
Since 2002, the ratio of total euro banknotes in 
circulation (i.e. including both domestic and 
external use) to euro-area nominal GDP has 
followed a continuous upward trend and is now 
higher than the equivalent ratio for the United 
States. Due to the stability and wide acceptance 
of the single currency, euro banknotes circulate 
in a large number of countries outside the euro 
area, functioning as a store of value and a 
medium of exchange. However, given the short 
history of the euro, the US dollar remains of 
considerably greater importance outside its 
borders. While difficult to measure accurately, 
estimates suggest that about USD 450 billion in 
banknotes circulate outside the US whereas the 
value of euro banknotes held by non-residents is 
estimated at around USD 100 billion (ECB 
2007).  
The official use of an international currency in 
the store-of-value function is linked to the 
monetary authorities' choice of denomination of 
their official foreign exchange reserves. Their 
choice depends inter alia on the country’s 
exchange rate regime and anchor, the direction 
of trade flows and invoicing currency, the 
currency denomination of debt, and risk 
diversification strategies.20 This means that, 
similarly to the use of the euro as an anchor 
currency, the role of the euro as a reserve 
currency is most prominent in countries in the 
geographical neighbourhood of the euro area and 
in countries with an institutional link to the EU. 
                                                     
20  See Dooley, M. P., S. Lizondo, and D. Mathieson (1989), 
'The currency composition of foreign exchange reserves', 
IMF Staff Papers, 36(2), pp. 385-434, 
and Eichengreen, B. J. and D.J. Mathieson (2000), 'The 
currency composition of foreign exchange reserves: 
retrospect and prospect', IMF Working Paper No. 
00/131. 
Table 7: Countries with exchange rate regimes linked to the euro (as of 1 January 2007) (1) 
Region Exchange rate regimes Countries 
ERM II Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia 
Euro-based currency boards Bulgaria 
Peg arrangements with fluctuation band based on the euro  Hungary 
European Union 
(non-euro area) 
Managed floating with the euro as  reference currency Czech Republic, Romania 
Euro-based currency boards Bosnia and Herzegovina Candidate and 
potential candidate 
countries 
Peg arrangements or managed floating with the euro as 
reference currency 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia 
Peg arrangements based on the euro CFA Franc Zone, French overseas territories, 
Cape Verde, Comoros 
Others 
Peg arrangements and managed floats  based on the SDR and 
other currency baskets including the euro (share of euro) 
Seychelles (37.7%), Russian Federation 
(40%) (2), Libya, Botswana, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Vannatu 
(1) The following are also using the euro: Montenegro; Kosovo under UNSCR1244, European microstates; French territorial communities.
(2) Euro share in Russia's operational basket increased in Feb 2007 to 45% 
Source: ECB (2007), 'Review of the international role of the euro, June. 
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The ECB (2007) shows that in most EU 
neighbouring economies that disclose the 
currency composition of their reserves, the share 
of the euro ranges from 40% to 85%. In the 
world's total disclosed official foreign exchange 
reserves, however, the dollar remains the 
dominant currency. The euro accounted for a 
share of around 25% by mid-2007, compared to 
a share of 65% for the US dollar.21 Data on the 
currency composition of global foreign reserves 
also shows that, since 1999, some diversification 
out of US dollars into euros has taken place. 
Diversification out of US dollars and into euros 
appears to have been more pronounced among 
countries with close economic and institutional 
links to the euro area and less important in Asia, 
the Americas and countries with dollar pegs.22  
Factors supporting the internationalisation of 
the euro 
As outlined above, the euro has rapidly gained 
recognition since its introduction and has 
become the second most important international 
currency behind the US dollar. The 
internationalisation of a currency depends on (i) 
the economic size and significance of foreign 
trade flows of the issuing country; (ii) the size, 
liquidity and efficiency of its financial markets; 
and (iii) the degree of confidence in the currency 
value. 
(i) Economic size and trade flows. International 
currencies are usually associated with large and 
competitive economies with important trade and 
financial links across the world. The larger a 
country's share in world output, the more likely it 
is that other countries will use its currency in 
international transactions. Based on current 
exchange rates, the euro area accounted for 
around 22% of world GDP in 2006, somewhat 
                                                     
21  Full data on the currency breakdown of reserves is not 
available. IMF COFER data are the most comprehensive 
but they are only published at an aggregate level and only 
include reserves held by central banks that actually 
disclose the currency composition of their reserves to the 
IMF. This means that some major reserve accumulators, 
most notably in Asia, including China, are not included in 
COFER data. 
22  See Lim, E.G. (2006), 'The euro's challenge to the dollar: 
different views from economists and evidence from 
COFER (Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange 
Reserves) and other data', IMF Working Paper No. 
06/153. 
below the 27% share of the US but well above 
the shares of Japan and China (Table 8). The 
share of the EU in world GDP was 30%, larger 
than that of the US. With euro-area enlargement 
expected to continue in the coming years, the 
euro-area's share in world GDP should therefore 
move closer to that of the US.  
The size of a country's foreign trade flows is also 
a relevant factor for the internationalisation of a 
currency. Its use in trade invoicing and as 
exchange rate anchor is more directly linked to 
the magnitude of an economy’s trade flows than 
to the size of its GDP. As Table 8 shows, the 
euro area's share of world trade flows is similar 
to that of the US. 
Table 8: Key characteristics of selected 
economies (2006) 
 
 
Population 
(million) 
Share of 
world GDP 
(%) (1) 
Share of 
world trade 
(%) (2) 
EU 493 30.3 17.4 
Euro area 317 21.9 13.3 
USA 300 27.3 13.1 
UK 61 5.0 6.1 
Japan 128 9.1 7.1 
China 1314 5.5 N/A 
(1) GDP based on nominal exchange rate. 
(2) Average share in world trade of imports and exports of 
goods and services, excluding intra-EU trade. 
Source: IMF and World Trade Organisation. 
 
(ii) Financial markets. International currency 
status is usually associated with open, large and 
liquid financial markets, including well-
functioning secondary markets for international 
securities and a wide range of additional financial 
services that attracts business from abroad. As 
shown in Table 9, the size of the euro area's 
financial system (USD 53.3 trillion at end-2006), 
as measured by the sum of its stock market 
capitalisation, debt securities and commercial 
bank assets, is roughly the same as that of the US  
(USD 56.5 trillion) and much larger than that of 
Japan (USD 19.9 trillion). The corresponding 
figure for the EU as a whole is much higher 
(USD 72.9 trillion), substantially exceeding that 
of the United States. This largely reflects the 
addition of the UK, whose stock market is the 
third largest in the world. But for enjoying an 
international currency status, the size of the 
equity and debt securities markets is more 
relevant than the size of the banking system. As 
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Table 9 shows, commercial bank assets are 2½ 
times larger in the euro area than in the US, but 
the US stock market capitalisation is more than 
twice the size of that of the euro area.23  
An indicator of both financial market size and 
financial development is the geographical 
distribution of foreign exchange market turnover 
as it reflects, to some extent, all kinds of 
international financial transactions, including 
short- and long-term transactions, bank and 
securities assets, equities, bonds and derivatives. 
The last column of Table 9 shows that the euro 
area's importance as a global financial hub is still 
limited. Its share of global foreign exchange 
market turnover is considerably smaller than that 
of the UK and the US. However, these statistics 
on foreign exchange rate turnover by 
country/region do not reflect the fact that a 
considerable share of trading in the UK's foreign 
exchange and derivatives markets is denominated 
in euros (respectively about one third and one 
half, of total turnover).  
The liquidity and efficiency of the underlying 
financial markets is at least as important as their 
size for the development of a currency's 
international functions. Before the launch of 
EMU, several authors pointed out that the euro 
area still lagged significantly behind the US in 
terms of financial market efficiency, as measured 
by indicators such as average spreads reported by 
dealers and bond market turnover ratios. 
However, by contributing to the integration of 
the euro area’s financial markets, the euro is 
                                                     
23 This reflects the fact that EU companies have tended to 
finance their activities through bank loans rather than 
through bond and equity, whereas the US corporate 
sector relies more heavily on bond and equity financing. 
helping to increase their depth, liquidity, and 
efficiency.24 This process, which is being 
reinforced by the implementation of the EU's 
legislation in the area of financial services, should 
support the internationalisation of the euro. 
(iii) Confidence in the value of the currency. A 
precondition for gaining and keeping 
international currency status is confidence that 
the currency's value is reliable in terms of future 
purchasing power. This confidence depends on, 
inter alia, the perceived strength and stability of 
the economy of the issuing country or area. High 
and volatile inflation or the presence of large 
external imbalances tends to increase the 
uncertainty about a currency's future value. The 
ECB, with its high degree of statutory autonomy 
and clear mandate to maintain price stability, has 
kept euro-area consumer price inflation low and 
stable since it took charge of the single monetary 
policy in 1999. The EU's fiscal policy framework, 
including the Stability and Growth Pact, helps to 
ensure that euro-area countries pursue prudent 
fiscal policies. Regarding the external position, 
the euro-area current account position has been 
in surplus or in broad balance since 1999 while 
its net international investment position amounts 
to 12½% of GDP. This compares favourably 
with the external position of the United States, 
which has a sizeable current account deficit and 
has moved from a positive net creditor position 
of almost 13% of GDP in 1980 to a net debtor 
equivalent to 20% of GDP at the end of 2006.  
 
                                                     
24  See for instance Pagano, M. and E-L. von Thadden, 
(2004), 'The European bond markets under EMU', Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 4. 
Table 9: Selected indicators of financial market size 
(in billions of U.S dollars, 2006) 
  
Stock market 
capitalisation (1) 
Total debt 
securities (2) 
Commercial bank 
assets (3) 
Equity, debt and bank 
assets (1+2+3) 
Forex market 
turnover (1) 
EU 13068.8 23202.7 36642.0 72913.5 49.0
Euro area 8419.1 18768.3 25837.6 53268.8 10.8
USA 19569.0 26735.8 10204.7 56509.4 16.6
UK 3794.3 3297.7 9212.6 16304.6 34.1
Japan 4795.8 8719.3 6415.4 19930.5 6.0
(1) Geographical distribution of foreign exchange market turnover (% of total). 
Source: IMF and BIS. 
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Incumbency advantages and historical 
inertia 
The determinants of a currency's international 
status discussed above suggest that the euro's 
international currency role could eventually attain 
roughly the same importance as the dollar. 
However, historical experience shows that 
incumbency advantages and inertia tend to 
prolong the international role of a currency even 
after the circumstances that led to its 
international expansion have changed. Just like 
domestic money, an international currency 
derives its value from the fact that others are 
using it. As the network grows, the currency's 
liquidity increases while transaction costs decline 
which, in turn, attracts new users to the network. 
Network externalities tend to drive one currency 
toward market dominance and, once achieved, to 
keep it in that position. They are especially 
important in determining the use of a currency as 
a foreign exchange vehicle. Similarly, the 
advantages of using a single unit of account in 
international commodity markets make it very 
difficult for this role to be shared among two or 
more currencies. The implication is that small 
changes in the determinants discussed above will 
not lead to corresponding changes in the status 
and use of an international currency, at least not 
in the short run. 
Conclusion 
From its introduction in 1999, the euro quickly 
emerged as the second most important 
international currency after the US dollar and it 
continues to consolidate its position. The euro is 
extensively used in international debt markets 
and its role in international trade and in official 
foreign exchange reserves has been growing 
gradually. But almost 10 years after its 
introduction, the internationalisation of the euro 
is characterised by a strong regional and 
institutional pattern. The international use of the 
euro is mainly concentrated to countries 
neighbouring the euro area, in other countries 
with special economic and political links to the 
EU, and in transactions directly involving euro-
area economic agents.  
The structural characteristics of the euro area 
support the international importance of the euro. 
Its international role, particularly in the regions 
neighbouring the euro area, could evolve in the 
future depending on a number of factors, 
including first and foremost the euro-area's 
ability to develop more integrated and more 
efficient financial markets. It will also depend on 
the eventual size of the euro area and in 
particular on whether the United Kingdom will 
eventually join it, which would boost the 
importance of the euro area as a global financial 
hub. A third factor concerns the future relative 
evolution of the euro-area and US economies 
and, in particular, on the extent to which the US 
manages to bring its current account deficit to a 
more sustainable position. Finally, it will depend 
on the portfolio diversification policies of central 
banks with large reserve holdings.  
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4. Labour market reforms in the euro 
area  
Introduction 
The need for labour market reforms was already 
widely acknowledged during the run-up to the 
third stage of EMU. Increased economic 
turbulence, globalisation, skill-biased 
technological change and demographic 
developments called into question the design of 
existing labour market institutions. With 
economic interactions more subject to 
competitive pressures, the lack of reforms will 
raise the efficiency losses of labour market 
institutions motivated only by distributional 
concerns25. What membership of the euro area 
adds is a greater demand for adjustment capacity, 
since monetary instruments previously used to 
cushion shocks are no longer available, while the 
creation of the euro area may increase the degree 
of competition and regional specialisation (and 
thus the frequency of asymmetric shocks).  
An issue widely discussed in the literature is 
whether membership of the euro area has led to 
a speeding up or slowing down of labour market 
reforms in euro-area countries. In a fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rate regime, mounting 
structural disequilibria culminate in an exchange 
rate crisis which highlights the need to reform.26 
In a monetary union, the exchange rate is no 
longer available to national governments as a tool 
to ease adjustment to country-specific shocks. 
This would imply an acceleration of the reform 
process within the euro area. However, since 
within monetary union structural imbalances are 
less likely to be punished by the financial 
markets, structural disequilibria tend to 
accumulate over time and reveal only gradually 
the need for reforms. Thus, the reform process is 
likely to be discontinuous, with stops and starts.  
The present section reviews the different, and 
sometimes conflicting, views on the incentives to 
                                                     
25  Bertola G. and T. Boeri (2003), 'Product market 
integration, institutions and the labour markets', mimeo. 
26  However, no guarantees exist that credible reforms will 
be implemented in the aftermath of the crisis. For 
example, already during the period of ERM membership, 
the Netherlands introduced important labour market 
reforms, while Italy started to reform its labour market 
only at a time when the prospects of euro-area 
membership became certain.  
undertake labour market reforms in the euro 
area. It also presents some evidence on the 
recent path of labour market reforms, drawing 
on the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti 
database (FRDB). This dataset allows to compare 
the reform experience for the first seven years 
under the euro with the period that immediately 
preceded Stage III of EMU.  
EMU and labour market reforms 
The prevalent view before 1999 was that: (i) the 
smooth operation of the euro area would require 
a more flexible labour market that could bear a 
larger share of the short-term adjustment burden 
to asymmetric shocks; and (ii) competitive forces 
unleashed by euro-area membership might well 
increase the pressure for reforms.   
Some argued that euro-area participation would 
help remove the barriers to labour market 
reforms and create incentives to implement 
reforms that favour flexibility and efficiency, the 
so-called 'There Is No Alternative' to reform 
('TINA' argument).27 Euro-area participation 
should encourage structural reforms on the 
grounds that it provides a precautionary motive 
to speed up labour and product market reforms 
at the country level as it makes the costs of not 
reforming more evident.28 Insofar as the 
common currency increases the transparency of 
price signals, the costs of non-reformed 
institutions become more evident. If lower 
trading costs reduce product market rents, the 
incentives to resist reform that prevent the 
appropriation of these rents is lessened.  
Others have argued that the incentives to reform 
labour markets are weaker inside than outside the 
monetary union.29 Outside the euro area, reforms 
help to reduce both the inflation bias, which 
derives from the lack of credibility of anti-
inflationary government policies (i.e. their time 
                                                     
27 Bean C.R. (1998), 'The interaction of aggregate-demand 
policies and labour market reform', Swedish Economic Policy 
Review, Vol.5, No.2, pp.353-82. 
28  Calmfors L. (2001), 'Unemployment, labour market 
reform, and monetary union', Journal of Labour Economics, 
Vol.19, No.2, pp. 265-89. 
29 Calmfors L. (1998), 'Macroeconomic policy, wage setting, 
and employment – what difference does the EMU 
make?', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
pp. 125-51. 
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Graph 16: Employment and participation rates in euro-area countries and non euro-area EU countries 
(Index 1999=1; 1995-2006)  
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Sources: Commission services. 
 
inconsistency), and the level of unemployment. 
With the euro area, the inflation bias vanishes 
and the incentives to undertake structural 
reforms are weakened.30 This argument has been 
summarised by saying that in EMU, 'there is no 
double dividend in labour market reforms'.  
While there is broad agreement on the 
desirability of reforms, the directions such 
reforms might take appears to deserve a closer 
look, particularly whether they can be expected 
to enhance flexibility. The increase in the real 
wage elasticity of labour demand weakens the 
bargaining power of unions and raises the cost of 
labour market distortions. However, higher 
exposure to market risks may generate a demand 
for greater protection even at the costs of 
efficiency, particularly from those socio-
economic groups at higher labour market risk, 
who may perceive their chances of stable 
                                                     
30 IMF (1999), 'Chronic unemployment in the Euro area: 
Causes and cures', World Economic Outlook, Chapter 
IV, pp. 88-121. 
employment relationship as beeing weakened by 
partial labour market reforms.31  
Participation in the euro area will affect the 
incentives to reform in directions that depend on 
the type of labour market distortions, public 
preferences and unions' strength.32 For instance 
the incentive to reduce employment protection 
will depend on the extent to which society cares 
about the volatility of employment. When 
monetary policy cannot accommodate reforms 
undertaken in single countries, reforms that 
reduce the equilibrium unemployment engender 
a large deflationary shock that can only be 
absorbed by a gradual improvement in 
                                                     
31  Bertola G. and T. Boeri (2002), 'EMU labour markets two 
years on: Microeconomic tensions and institutional 
evolution', in M. Buti and A. Sapir (EDS), EMU anbe 
arugued d economic policy in Europe: The challenge of the early 
years, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 249-280. 
32 Bentolila S. and G. Saint-Paul (2001), 'Will EMU increase 
Eurosclerosis?', in C. Wyplosz, ed., The impact of EMU on 
Europe and the developing countries, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 128-68. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 31 - 
competitiveness and exports.33 The adjustment is 
likely to be slow, implying that large-scale 
reforms could be more difficult to put in place 
than more partial and gradual reforms.34  
Describing the impact of euro-area 
participation on labour market reforms 
After peaking at almost 11% in 1994, the euro-
area unemployment rate started gradually to 
decline, and by 2007 was hovering around 7.5%. 
This decline occurred while both the 
employment and participation rates kept rising. 
Most notable were the increases in the female 
and the older workers employment and 
participation rates, the most dynamic 
components with increases since 1995 of higher 
than 9 pp (Graph 16). Commission estimates of 
the NAIRU suggest a reduction in structural 
unemployment, which is reflected in the decline 
of long-term unemployment (over 12 months) 
and youth unemployment (under-25s). 
                                                     
33  If the reform reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, 
while the initial level of unemployment remains high, the 
market mechanism will entail a downward adjustment of 
prices and wages that cannot be stabilised by the common 
monetary policy. Gains in competitiveness and exports 
will gradually remove the unemployment gap but the 
process is likely to be slow in case of nominal price/wage 
rigidities.  
34  This argument, however, suggests that in the euro area 
there is a case for undertaking reforms in a coordinated 
manner across Member States.  
In spite of these improvements, the labour 
market performance of the euro area remains 
somewhat disappointing. Low labour force 
participation still prevails among women and 
older working-age people. Long-term 
unemployment remains a serious concern as 
about 45% of unemployed people have been out 
of work for one year or more, compared to less 
than 15% in the US. There is a distinct 
geographical dimension to the problem in several 
countries, with severe disparities (in terms of 
both employment and unemployment) between 
leading and lagging regions.  
Most discussions of the impact of euro-area 
membership on labour markets have tended to 
focus on wage bargaining. Despite the vast 
literature on labour market institutions and 
labour market performances, only a few studies 
have described the effects of euro-area 
membership on labour market institutions. 
Bertola and Boeri (2002), using information on 
reforms of non-employment benefits and 
employment protection collected by a variety of 
sources, show an acceleration of reforms after 
1998.35 Driven by the increase in gradual 
reforms, the orientation of the reform efforts 
was towards relaxing employment protection 
legislation, through looser regulation of atypical 
contracts, and ensuring a rise in the rewards from 
                                                     
35  Bertola G. and T. Boeri (2002), Op. cit.  
The time span of the analysis in their paper is 1987-1999. 
Graph 17: Reforms in the euro area: scope and direction 
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The left panel shows the distribution of reforms according to whether they are radical or marginal. The right panel shows the distribution of 
reforms based on whether they increase/decrease labour market flexibility; increase/decrease reward from work; increase/decrease generosity 
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left and the right panels of the graph. Sources: Commission services based on FRDB database. 
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work. In contrast, Duval and Elmeskov (2006), 
using an indicator of the overall intensity of 
reforms developed as part of the assessment of 
the OECD Job Strategy, conclude that the 
advent of the third stage of EMU did not 
coincide with a pick up of labour market 
reforms.36 37  
The striking difference between the findings of 
these two studies highlights the importance of 
the methodology used to combine qualitative 
information which responds to different 
objectives. The OECD indicators have been 
developed to monitor progress in the 
implementation of the Job Strategy, while the 
data used by Bertola and Boeri (2002) categorise 
reforms according to their expected effects on 
labour market flexibility and/or their scope – i.e. 
marginal or radical.  
Comparing reform efforts between the pre- 
and post-EMU period  
Using FRDB data on the scope and the direction 
of the reforms38, this section explores whether 
the pace of labour market reforms has 
accelerated since the creation of the euro area. It 
is important to bear in mind two main caveats: 
                                                     
36 Duval R.. and J. Elmeskov  (2006), 'The effects of EMU 
on structural reforms in labour and product markets', 
European Central Bank working paper series, No. 596, March. 
37 Yet, compared to the OECD average, it is shown that a 
number of euro-area countries have pursued both far-
reaching and comprehensive reform strategies while only 
few have confined themselves to either minor reforms or 
reforms covering only a number of areas. 
38 This data was kindly provided by the Fondazione Rodolfo 
DeBenedetti. 
• Labour market reforms follow a discontinuous 
path with many measures predating the 
establishment of the euro area and 
membership of the euro area being only one of 
several factors driving reforms; 
• The impact of policy reforms on labour market 
performance usually occurs with lags while the 
interaction of a wide range of labour market 
policies and institutions also have a relevant 
bearing on the outcome, not to mention 
complementarities and interaction with policies 
in product and capital markets. 
Data available from the FRDB enable the scope 
and direction of labour market reforms to be 
tracked over time.39 In the early years of 
monetary union, there was an increase in the 
number of gradual reforms implemented in all 
areas except pension systems (Graph 17 – left 
panel). The reform process was characterised by 
a sequence of gradual reforms rather than a few 
radical changes, partly confirming the view that 
euro-area membership reduces the incentives for 
large-scale labour market reforms. However, 
since gradual reforms prevailed also in the years 
before 1999, the change in the monetary regime 
                                                     
39  The FRDB database holds information on reforms of 
employment protection legislation, non-employment 
benefits, pensions and migration in the EU countries 
over the period 1987-2005. For each policy area, reforms 
are categorised according to their comprehensiveness, as 
well as on the basis of their expected effects on: labour 
market distortions, reward to labour market 
participation, generosity of pension systems and 
immigration policies. In the database terminology, 
comprehensiveness is labelled either 'marginal' or 
'radical'.  Reforms are 'marginal' if they do not cover all 
types of labour contracts, all beneficiaries of 
unemployment benefits or pensions etc.. In the present 
section these partial reforms are qualified as gradual. 
Graph 18: Reforms increasing flexibility and initial labour market conditions: 1995-1998 
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did not represent a clear break with respect to the 
previous reform strategies. 
Turning to the broad orientation of labour 
market reforms, according to the TINA 
argument an acceleration of reforms improving 
the adjustment capacity of the labour market 
should be expected under the monetary union. 
Graph 17 (right panel) displays the number of 
reforms according to their broad orientation for 
the euro area as a whole. After the launch of the 
euro area, there was a shift toward reforms that 
reward overall work effort. Finally, reforms that 
reduce the generosity of migration policies are 
more prevalent, which is suggestive of a policy 
shift from non-national to national working-age 
population.  
The effect of euro-area membership can be seen 
by looking at the changes in the distribution of 
the number of reforms at the Member State level 
(comparing Graph 18 and 19). During the years 
that preceded the launch of the common 
currency (1995-1998), countries implementing 
more reforms increasing the flexibility of the 
labour market (by loosening the employment 
protection legislation and by reducing the benefit 
dependency and the generosity of the pension 
system) were also those that performed relatively 
better in terms of both participation and 
employment rates (Graph 18). About 60% of the 
differences in the reforms increasing flexibility 
between 1995 and 1998 were accounted for by 
the diversity in the initial levels of the 
participation rates, especially of women (right 
panel). Similar patterns can be observed when 
using the employment rates instead of the 
participation rate.  
However, in the EMU years, the relationship 
between the reforms increasing flexibility and the 
level of the participation rate at the beginning of 
Stage III turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the employment rate at the start of 
Stage III is negatively correlated with the reforms 
increasing the labour market flexibility and the 
reward of work undertaken in the 1999-2005 
period, suggestive of a policy convergence across 
euro-area countries (Graph 19).40 The change in 
                                                     
40  Differences in the overall employment rates at the 
beginning of the Stage III account for 45% of all pension 
reforms enhancing the incentives to work introduced 
after 1999, suggestive of policy makers' efforts to increase 
the employment rate of future older workers.  
the sign of the correlation indicates that, contrary 
to the pre-EMU period, reforms in EMU were 
indeed introduced by those countries that needed 
them most.  
Graph 19: Reforms increasing flexibility and initial 
labour market conditions: 1999-2005 
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Source: Commission services based on FRDB and LFS data.  
Conclusion  
While the case for reforms is widely recognised, 
and euro-area participation may in some respects 
act as a further encouragement, there are 
countervailing forces. In particular, while euro-
area participation increases the demand for 
economic adjustment, it may also increase the 
demand for protection against the risks 
associated with adjustment. Although this may 
not necessarily be a barrier to reforms, it does 
need to be taken into account in designing them.   
Empirical evidence of possible changes in the 
pace of structural reforms under the euro 
remains limited and contradictory. Research 
based on indicators developed by the OECD 
suggests that the advent of the third stage of 
EMU did not coincide with an acceleration of 
labour market reforms. Evidence drawn from the 
FRDB database presented in this section is 
somewhat more nuanced. For the euro area as a 
whole, the reform process in the early years of 
the euro was characterised by a sequence of 
gradual reforms rather than by a few radical 
changes. However, the data also shows an 
encouraging shift in the pattern of reforms at the 
Member State level in the early years of the euro 
with more reforms being introduced by those 
countries that need them most. The challenge is 
to pursue this reform process. 
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Focus 
II. Euro-area productivity trends – An industry-level perspective 
Over the last decade, the euro area has experienced a slowdown in labour productivity relative both to previous time periods 
and to the US. This focus section exploits a new sectoral database to shed some light on the possible causes of this 
disappointing performance. The analysis shows that the relative weakness of productivity in the euro area can be traced back 
to developments in total factor productivity (TFP) rather than developments in capital formation patterns and can be 
attributed to a small group of industries, including electrical and optical equipment; wholesale and retail trade; financial 
services; and other business services. On a more encouraging note, there is one area of the economy where the euro area has 
managed to consistently outperform the US in TFP terms over the recent years, namely the 'network' industries.  
An econometric analysis of the determinants of TFP growth shows that, whilst there is a convergence trend across countries in 
terms of TFP, the catching-up process has weakened over time, especially in the post-1995 period. In fact, TFP growth now 
appears to be increasingly associated with innovation and technological spillovers from countries positioned at the 'technology 
frontier'. Technological spillovers are likely to be stronger in countries making more intensive use of R&D and human 
capital. 
The analysis suggests that the TFP trends in those specific industries where euro-area-US differences are concentrated are 
influenced by a relatively wide spectrum of factors. Whereas the relative under-performance of the euro area's ICT-producing 
manufacturing industry (mainly semiconductors) is linked to R&D intensity factors, the divergences in the retail and 
wholesale trade industries relate to cyclical factors and the better exploitation of scale economies. Finally, the euro-area’s out-
performance of the US in the network industries seems to be mainly linked to one-off static efficiency gains associated with the 
sustained deregulation drive which occurred in these industries over the last two decades.   
Despite the recent upturn in growth, the euro 
area's overall growth performance since the mid-
1990s has been relatively disappointing. While 
many Member States have managed to improve 
their labour market positions, this has 
unfortunately been accompanied by a slowdown 
on the productivity side in a significant number 
of countries, in sharp contrast to many other 
developed economies, in particular the US where 
the long-term downward movement in 
productivity growth rates experienced since the 
1970s was reversed around the mid-1990s.  
Whilst there have been a number of analyses of 
the possible causes of the euro area's 
disappointing performance at the macro level, it 
has until recently been difficult to conduct a 
detailed cross-country examination at the 
industry level due to lack of adequate data. This 
situation has significantly improved with the 
March 2007 release of the EU KLEMS datasets. 
EU KLEMS provides data on economic growth, 
productivity, employment, capital formation and 
technological change for a large range of 
manufacturing and service industries. This focus 
section exploits this dataset to shed new light on 
the likely causes of the productivity slowdown in 
the euro area.41 Section 1 presents the broad 
stylised facts concerning productivity trends at 
the economy-wide and industry levels for the 
euro area and the US. Section 2 examines in 
more detail the possible determinants of total 
factor productivity (TFP) performance at the 
industry level, assessing in particular the role 
played by the regulatory environment and by 
knowledge production (R&D and education). 
Section 3 discusses some policy implications.  
1.  Euro-area productivity trends at the 
aggregate and sectoral level 
A productivity slowdown mostly attributable 
to the private services sector 
As shown in Graph 20, productivity growth in 
the euro area fell below the US rate in the late 
1990s, bringing its post World War II 
convergence with US productivity levels to an 
end. Graph 20 also shows a decomposition of 
productivity growth in the euro area and the US 
into three broad sectors, namely manufacturing, 
private services and the rest of the economy (i.e. 
                                                     
41  The analysis presented here is a shortened version of 
Chapter II in European Commission (2007), 'EU 
Economy 2007 Review', European Economy No 8.  
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primary industries plus public services). The 
graph shows the contributions of each of these 
sectors to the change in labour productivity of 
the total economy. The four panels of the graph 
have the same scale and are additive (i.e. 
manufacturing + services + rest of economy = 
total economy).42 This data shows that the US’s 
out-performance of the euro area in terms of 
labour productivity has applied right across the 
various sectors of industry, with both the 
manufacturing and private services sectors 
showing contrasting fortunes for the two areas. 
It also indicates that most of the deterioration in 
the relative productivity performance of the euro 
area can be attributed to the private services 
sector. For the most recent years, there has been 
a gap between the trend productivity of the US 
and the euro area of the order of 0.8 pp., with 
roughly 95% of the gap emanating from private 
services and 33% from manufacturing (with an 
offsetting -28% contribution for the rest of the 
                                                     
42  The trends have been calculated using a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter. 
economy where the productivity performance 
was actually stronger in the euro area than in the 
US).  
Some insights from growth accounting  
A wide variety of methods can be used to 
decompose real GDP growth into its main 
determinants, one of which is applied by the EU 
KLEMS research consortium.43 This variant 
essentially uses a production function which 
includes productive capital (a volume index of 
capital services); human capital (a skills-based 
indicator of the average qualifications of the 
labour force); employment levels adjusted for 
hours worked; and a residual term which, 
amongst other things, includes an estimate of the 
level of efficiency associated with the use of the 
various factors of production.  
                                                     
43  See European Commission, op. cit., for more details. 
Graph 20: Trend contributions to the total change in labour productivity per hour: euro area and US   
(in %) 
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Table 10 gives the results for the euro area and 
the US using the EU KLEMS growth 
accounting approach, with value added being 
decomposed into labour services, capital services 
and TFP.44 The table shows that the big labour 
productivity gap between the euro area and the 
US over the period since 1995 has been mainly 
driven by TFP developments although 
differences in the value added contribution of 
ICT capital services was a significant additional 
explanatory factor over the period 1996-2000. 
Over the most recent period, 2001-2004, it is 
                                                     
44  Due to the lack of capital stock data for some Member 
States, a detailed growth accounting analysis at the 
industry level is only possible for 8 euro-area countries. 
The euro-area aggregates computed below therefore 
exclude Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.  
clearly TFP which has driven the euro-area-US 
productivity differences. For ‘total industries’, 
the TFP growth rate differential since 2000 is an 
alarming 1.8 pp, compared with a TFP gap of 
only 0.4 pp over 1996-2000. 
This gap in TFP growth rates is widespread at 
the sectoral level, with very large and rising euro-
area-US TFP growth rate differentials for both 
the manufacturing and private services sectors. 
In the manufacturing sector, capital services 
trends in both areas appear to be broadly 
converging over time, with this pattern being a 
feature of both ICT and non-ICT capital 
deepening. In contrast, it is interesting to note 
that in the services sector there is a clear 
compositional shift in the US towards greater 
Table 10: Growth accounting analysis – Gross value added growth and contributions  
(Annual average volume growth rates in %) 
 Euro area (1) US 
 1981-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 1981-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 
 Total Industries 
1. Labour Services 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.3 -0.5 
2. Capital Services 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.7 2.0 0.9 
Of which        
ICT 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.6 
Non-ICT 0.8 0.8 0.7 1 0.6 0.3 
3. TFP 0.6 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.7 
Total Industries 1.9 2.4 1.3 2.8 4.1 2.1 
 Manufacturing 
1. Labour Services -1.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 -3.4 
2. Capital Services 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.8 0.2 
Of which        
ICT 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.3 
Non-ICT 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.7 -0.1 
3. TFP 1.6 1.3 0.5 2.2 2.8 4.0 
Total Manufacturing 1.4 2.2 0.4 3.0 4.9 0.8 
 Private Services 
1. Labour Services 0.7 1.2 0.6 1.4 2.1 -0.1 
2. Capital Services 1.4 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.5 1.2 
Of which        
ICT 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.9 0.9 
Non-ICT 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.5 0.6 0.3 
3. TFP 0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 1.6 
Total  Private Services 2.7 2.9 1.6 3.2 5.1 2.6 
 Rest of Economy 
1. Labour Services 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 
2. Capital Services 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.8 
Of which        
ICT 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 
Non-ICT 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
3. TFP -0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 
Total Rest of Economy 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.7 2.0 
(1) Euro area excluding EL, IE, LU and PT. 
Source: EU KLEMS, Commission services 
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levels of ICT capital deepening. While the gap 
between the two areas with regard to total capital 
services is small, there is evidence that the US's 
capital spending is increasingly being focused on 
ICT rather than on the more traditional forms of 
capital expenditure. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the bulk of the overall economy-wide 
differences in ICT capital spending between the 
euro area and the US since the mid-1990s is due 
to higher ICT investment spending in the private 
services sector.  
TFP differentials with the US can be traced 
back to a small number of sectors  
Due to the availability of capital stock data for a 
large number of individual industries in EU 
KLEMS, it is possible to do a more detailed 
productivity breakdown of the manufacturing, 
private services and 'rest of economy' sectors by 
examining those industries in the databank 
where capital stock data exists and which are 
therefore amenable to growth accounting 
analysis (28 in total – 14 manufacturing, 7 
private services and 7 'other industries').  
Graph 21: 28 Industry breakdown of total TFP 
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(1) Euro area excluding EL, IE, LU and PT. 
Source: EU KLEMS, Commission services 
Graph 21 decomposes the total TFP growth gap 
between the US and the euro area over the 1996-
2004 period into the respective contributions of 
the 28 industries. The graph shows the highly 
industry-specific nature of the TFP differences, 
with only a handful of industries explaining the 
diverging euro-area-US trends, namely wholesale 
and retail trade; real estate and other business 
services; electrical and optical equipment (which 
includes semiconductors, the main ICT-
producing industry); and to a lesser extent 
financial services. On a more positive note, the 
graph also shows some industries where the euro 
area has done better, with a number of the so-
called 'network' industries doing particularly well.  
2.  The determinants of TFP growth  
The analysis in this section aims to isolate the 
critical factors behind differences in the 
evolution of TFP, which, as shown earlier, 
accounts for the most important share of the 
gap in productivity growth between the euro 
area and the US over the last decade. 
Conceptual framework: innovation as the 
key driver of growth  
A better understanding of the key determinants 
of TFP growth has been high on the research 
agenda of international organisations and the 
academic community over the past decade. 
There is a growing consensus in the literature 
that recent growth theories, based on 
'Schumpeterian' creative destruction 
mechanisms, can help interpret recent 
developments.45 These theories focus on 
innovation as the key driver of growth in 
economies at, or close to, the 'technology 
frontier'. Innovators, by introducing superior 
product varieties and technologies, have the 
effect of both displacing existing firms and of 
inducing the adoption of new products and 
techniques at the wider industry level. At the 
aggregate level, the innovation rate depends on 
the resources devoted to the innovation effort 
(i.e. R&D and human capital) and on the stock 
of existing knowledge (knowledge spillovers). 
The growth rate of the economy will depend not 
only on the rate of innovation but also on the 
rate at which 'state-of-the-art' technologies are 
adopted / diffused throughout the wider 
economy. Countries that are close to the 
                                                     
45  See for instance Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2006), 'Joseph 
Schumpeter Lecture: Appropriate Growth Policy: A 
Unifying Framework', Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 4(2-3), pp. 269-314. 
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technology frontier will mainly grow thanks to 
the development of new technologies, whilst the 
'follower' grouping of countries will derive the 
largest share of their TFP growth from the 
adoption of already existing, technologies which 
are available at the frontier.  
In this 'Schumpeterian' world, institutions and 
policies play a key role in determining the 
relative position of countries in the global 
innovation race. These framework conditions 
directly impact on the relative ability of countries 
to innovate at the frontier or to adopt existing 
leading-edge technologies. Follower countries 
would gain from institutions and policies 
favouring the cost-efficient adoption of existing 
technologies, while countries operating at the 
frontier would profit from policies that promote 
excellence in higher education and R&D; 
financial markets that reward risky projects; and 
regulations that do not put an excessively heavy 
burden on either incumbent firms or on 
potential entrants.  
A review of existing empirical work  
A number of papers in the literature have already 
analysed the determinants of TFP in a 
Schumpeterian framework. Most of the existing 
analyses use panel data information, pooling data 
on TFP levels and growth rates over several 
years and countries. Some papers also use 
information at the sectoral / industry levels, with 
the datasets usually obtained from the OECD's 
STAN database. The available empirical 
specifications normally reflect a reduced form of 
the basic innovation-imitation model, with most 
of them regressing TFP growth on two essential 
variables:  
• a measure of the technology gap (i.e. the 
distance between the TFP of the country 
analysed and that of the country with the highest 
level of efficiency); and  
• an estimate of the growth rate of TFP at 
the frontier (i.e. the TFP growth rate of the most 
efficient country).  
The first variable captures the extent to which 
TFP growth in a specific country can be 
explained by the adoption of more efficient 
existing technologies. The assumption here is 
simply that the larger the technology gap, the 
higher the potential gains from adopting more 
efficient, internationally available, technologies 
and consequently the faster the rate of TFP 
growth. The second variable aims to capture the 
link between TFP growth in the 'catching-up' 
country and the extent of innovation and 
knowledge spillovers which are occurring in the 
technologically most advanced country. In 
addition to these two basic explanatory variables, 
most papers also control for a series of policy 
and institutional factors that may affect the rate 
of TFP growth independently or may interact 
with the 'technology gap' and 'technology 
spillovers' variables to have an impact on TFP.  
The choice of explanatory factors which we use 
in our analysis of the factors driving 
technological change and efficiency gains is 
strongly driven by the work of Aghion and 
Howitt (2006) as well as the Sapir report.46 Both 
studies suggest that the failure of the EU's 
economic system to deliver a satisfactory growth 
performance from the mid-1990s onwards was 
due to outdated economic institutions (which 
were supportive of growth in the past but have 
now become an obstacle to growth) and the 
failure of the EU to transform its industrial 
structure to achieve an innovation-based 
economy. High growth in the post-WWII era 
was driven by high levels of industrial 
production, economies of scale and imitation of 
US technological advances. As the EU 
approached the technological frontier, growth 
became increasingly dependent on innovation.  
Both studies suggest that economies based on 
innovation are the key to higher employment 
and growth. The studies stress that innovation 
stems from entrepreneurial activities but that 
these activities can only develop if Europe 
focuses on reforming its education systems; 
promoting higher levels of better targeted R&D; 
ensuring better regulation to facilitate entry and 
exit of firms; providing more adequate 
infrastructure to facilitate the free movement of 
people, goods and ideas; stimulating innovation 
via financial and tax incentives; and promoting 
more labour market flexibility. 
                                                     
46  Aghion and Howitt (2006), op. cit.  
 Sapir, A. et al. (2003), 'An agenda for a growing Europe: 
Making the EU system deliver', report by an Independent 
High Level Group established on the initiative of the 
President of the European Commission'. 
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The growth-policy recommendations included in 
the above studies also find support in the 
empirical literature where innovation and 
imitation (i.e. adoption of available technologies) 
are assessed as to their respective roles in 
determining the overall technological gains of an 
economy. Within this overarching endogenous 
growth framework, the importance of the high / 
low skill composition of a country's human 
capital and the economy's distance from the 
technological frontier are both assessed.  
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Méghir (2006) 
show that if one holds the level of human capital 
constant, its growth-enhancing effects depend 
both on its composition and on distance to the 
technology frontier.47 More specifically, 
Vandenbussche et al. contend that the TFP 
growth-enhancing impact of skilled labour 
increases with a country's proximity to the 
frontier under the reasonable assumption that 
innovation is a more skill-intensive activity than 
imitation.  
In keeping with this theme, Acemoglu, Aghion 
and Zilibotti (2002) emphasise the distinction 
between innovation and imitation as two 
alternative sources of productivity growth and 
the importance of growth-maximising 
institutions or policies evolving as a country or 
industry catches up with the technology 
frontier.48 This line of reasoning is also 
supported by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith 
and Howitt (2003) who show that when most 
firms in an industry are close to the national 
technological frontier, product market 
competition is positive for innovation.49 This is 
also suggested in the paper by Aghion, Blundell, 
Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2006), which 
presents evidence that the closer industries in an 
economy are to the world technology frontier, 
the more growth-enhancing is the threat of 
                                                     
47  Vandenbussche, J., P. Aghion and C. Meghir (2006), 
'Growth, Distance to the Frontier and Composition of 
Human Capital', Journal of Economic Growth, 11, pp. 97-
127. 
48  Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, and F. Zilibotti, (2002), 
'Distance to Frontier, Selection and Economic Growth', 
NBER working paper 9066. 
49  Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith and 
P. Howitt (2003), 'Competition and Innovation, an 
inverted U Relationship', NBER working paper 9269. 
entry.50 Finally, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
also show that lowering barriers to entry has a 
positive effect in terms of stimulating TFP 
growth.51  
Empirical strategy and basic regression 
results 
The aim of the panel regression analysis 
presented hereafter is to build on existing work 
in this area by capitalising on the recent release 
of the EU KLEMS datasets and specifically on 
the increased availability of TFP data series and 
of substantially enhanced industry-level detail. 
The analysis concerns 9 EU countries plus the 
US over the 1980-2004 period and covers a total 
of 28 industries. The empirical approach is 
similar to that in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). 
In the baseline specification, TFP growth rates 
are regressed over a measure of innovation / 
technology spillovers (i.e. the TFP growth rate 
of the leader country) and of a technology gap 
term (i.e. the lagged logarithm of the difference 
between TFP in a specific country and TFP at 
the frontier, with the frontier being determined 
by the country exhibiting the highest TFP level 
in that particular industry, in that particular year). 
Country, sector and year fixed effects control for 
factors that may independently affect TFP 
growth rates.  
The basic regression results support the 
expectation that TFP growth is higher in a 
country when:52 
• there is stronger TFP growth in the frontier 
economy (which reflects the impact of 
innovation and technology spillovers); and  
• when the technology gap is larger, with the 
gap measured by the difference in TFP levels for 
the country in question relative to the global 
leader (which reflects the impact of adopting 
existing superior technologies). 
                                                     
50  Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell., R. Griffith and 
P. Howitt (2003), 'Competition and Innovation, an 
inverted U Relationship', NBER working paper 9269. 
51  Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta (2003), 'Regulation, 
Productivity and Growth: OECD Evidence', Economic 
Policy, 36, pp. 9-72, April. 
52  The basic regressions are not shown here due to lack of 
space but can be found in European Commission (2007), 
op. cit.  
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These results do not seem to be sector-specific; 
they also hold when the sample is restricted to 
the manufacturing, private services or ICT-
related sectors. They do, however, appear to be 
sensitive to the period chosen: in the decade 
from 1995-2004, TFP growth was mostly driven 
by growth at the frontier, with a non-significant 
impact from the technology gap variable. This 
finding is consistent with the view that across 
Europe, growth is increasingly being driven by 
innovation activity and less by the adoption of 
existing up-to-date technologies.  
In addition to the two main explanatory 
variables, the baseline specification was 
subsequently augmented to control for the 
impact of framework conditions. A long list of 
country-level variables were tested to capture the 
possible effect of, amongst other things, overall 
macroeconomic conditions; the presence of 
those economy-wide infrastructures which are 
most closely associated with the development of 
new technologies; the importance of ICT use; 
and the age structure of the population.  
Confounding our prior expectations, such 
economy-wide variables produced results which 
were generally insignificant in terms of their TFP 
effects. In addition, there is little evidence from 
the regressions that ICT use has had a large role 
to play in determining cross-country TFP trends. 
The overall contribution of ICT would appear to 
be adequately reflected in the growth accounting 
results presented earlier, with the regression 
Table 11: The role of human capital and R&D 
 
All 
Industries 
All 
Industries
All 
Industries
All 
Industries
Only 
manufacturing 
sector 
Only 
private 
services 
sector 
Only 
ICT-
related 
sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TFP growth at the frontier 0.177* 
(2.02) 
0.176* 
(2.02) 
0.187* 
(2.19) 
0.174** 
(2.66) 
0.173** 
(2.40) 
0.438*** 
(3.90) 
0.141** 
(3.16) 
Technological gap 0.083** 
(3.16) 
-0.082** 
(3.14) 
-0.079** 
(3.06) 
-0.080*** 
(3.21) 
-0.105** 
(2.80) 
-0.036 
(1.32) 
-0.013 
(1.41) 
        
Human capital  -0.009 
(1.40) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.006 
(0.55) 
-0.017 
(0.69) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
-0.007 
(1.01) 
R&D  0.001 
(0.33) 
0.005 
(1.33) 
0.005*** 
(4.96) 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
0.023 
(0.86) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
        
Interaction TFP growth at the 
frontier with human capital  
   0.169 
(1.32) 
0.216 
(1.40) 
0.198*** 
(5.39) 
0.128 
(1.32) 
Interaction TFP growth at the 
frontier with R&D  
   0.019 
(0.54) 
0.013 
(0.36) 
0.459 
(1.71) 
0.064 
(1.38) 
 
        
Interaction technological gap with 
human capital  
   0.018 
(0.89) 
0.015 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.014 
(0.99) 
Interaction technological gap with 
R&D  
   0.004 
(0.21) 
0.019 
(0.64) 
-0.033 
(0.64) 
-0.005 
(0.46) 
        
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
N. obs. 2385 2385 2385 2385 1535 674 892 
R2 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.31 
        
Notes – Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; standard errors robust with respect to heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within 
countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.  
TFP growth at the frontier: TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source EUKLEMS  
Technological gap: lagged log (TFP level –log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EUKLEMS  
Human capital: share of high skill labour compensation in total labour compensation. Standardised variable. Source: EUKLEMS  
R&D: R&D expenditure/gross output. Standardised variable. Source: OECD STAN 
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analysis finding little support for additional TFP-
enhancing spillover effects from an intensive use 
of ICT capital at the macro level. 
Human capital and R&D play a role at the 
technology frontier 
In recent years, there has been considerable 
interest in analysing the effects of investments in 
knowledge and human capital formation on the 
overall TFP performance of countries. With 
Europe lagging behind not only in terms of ICT 
penetration rates but also with regard to other 
indicators of knowledge production (such as 
R&D investments and the share of high-tech 
industries), the creation of knowledge capital has 
emerged as a central policy concern, with the 
Lisbon process being a concrete example of an 
ongoing policy programme aimed at boosting 
the pace of innovation.  
Against this background, Table 11 reports the 
results for the basic specification augmented to 
take into account the role of human capital and 
R&D in affecting TFP growth.53 The main 
message to be retained from the table is that 
both human capital and R&D do have a positive 
effect on TFP growth. R&D has a direct 
impact,54 while the effect of human capital is 
indirect, emanating from a stronger positive 
impact of TFP growth at the frontier. The 
influence of human capital, however, is highly 
sector-specific, and appears to be most effective 
in determining the TFP performance of the 
private services sector.55 However, for countries 
at or close to the technology frontier, policies 
aimed at improving the overall framework 
conditions for maximising the TFP benefits of 
                                                     
53  To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the human 
capital and R&D variables have been standardised in 
such a way as to have a zero mean and a unit standard 
deviation. When, for example, the human capital variable 
is interacted with variable x, the coefficient indicates the 
change in the coefficient of variable x which is associated 
with a one-standard-deviation increase in the human 
capital variable (while the coefficient of variable x 
indicates its impact in keeping human capital at its mean 
value). 
54  Column (1) shows that the direct impact of R&D is not 
significant. A significant impact is recovered only by 
eliminating sector fixed effects (as shown in columns (2) 
and (3)).  
55  This effect is captured by the significant coefficient on 
the human capital variable when interacted with the 
variable for TFP growth at the frontier in column (6). 
human capital and R&D would be directly 
beneficial in facilitating the transition of their 
growth models to one based more on their own 
internal innovation capacity. 
Effects of anti-competitive regulation seem 
to be highly industry-specific 
Recent studies report that levels of regulation are 
potentially crucial driving forces for efficiency 
gains. For instance, European Commission 
(2007) concludes that competition is crucial for 
both the level and growth rate of productivity.56  
To assess the importance of this specific 
determinant, Table 12 presents the results for 
the impact of several regulation indicators in the 
product, labour and financial markets on TFP 
performance.57 The results suggest that, across 
'all industries', the different regulatory indicators 
do not play a very important direct role in 
determining TFP growth, with non-significant 
results for most of the alternative specifications 
tested. In addition, there are some counter-
intuitive effects when the analysis is restricted 
solely to the manufacturing, private services or 
ICT-related sectors, with tighter product market 
and financial market regulations predicted to be 
positive for TFP growth in some specific 
sectors.  
With regard to the indirect interaction effects of 
the different forms of regulation, tighter 
financial market regulation appears to have 
consistently negative effects on TFP growth 
taking place at the frontier, both when all the 
sectors are pooled and when only individual 
sectors are considered in the regressions (i.e. 
manufacturing, private services and ICT-related 
sectors). In contrast, the results for product 
market regulations do not appear to be as robust 
since many of the coefficient estimates are 
insignificant and shift from positive to negative 
depending on the sector considered. As far as 
labour market regulations are concerned, they 
                                                     
56  European Commission (2007), 'Policies in the pursuit of 
higher productivity: another look', Chapter 4 in 'EU 
Economy 2007 Review', European Economy No 8. 
 See also OECD (2003), 'The Sources of economic 
growth in OECD countries'.  
57  To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the 
indicators are standardised. The indicators increase with 
the intensity of the regulatory burden.  
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appear to increase TFP growth at the frontier, 
irrespective of the sectoral breakdown used in 
the sample. Since the theoretical literature does 
not provide a clear-cut answer regarding the link 
between labour market regulation, innovation 
and TFP, a note of caution is required in 
interpreting the positive relationship between 
stricter labour market regulation and TFP 
growth. In particular, the limited time variation 
of the sample used in the regressions makes it 
difficult to disentangle the short-term 
transitional effects of labour market reforms, 
introduced by many EU countries since the early 
1990s, from the long-run impact of those 
reforms on TFP growth rates.58  
In overall terms, given the lack of any evidence 
of a direct impact from the regulatory indicators 
at the level of 'total industries' and the 
                                                     
58 On the one hand, stricter labour market regulation, 
notably employment protection legislation, may, by 
limiting the room for re-adjustment of the labour force 
in the event of redundancies, hinder the incentives for 
firms to engage in risky innovation projects, thus 
reducing TFP growth at the frontier. On the other hand, 
stronger protection of employment may increase training 
and investment in skills, which are generally 
complementary to innovation and TFP growth. 
Table 12: The role of regulations 
 
All Industries All Industries
Only 
manufacturing 
sector 
Only private 
services 
sector 
Only ICT-
related 
sectors 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TFP growth at the frontier 0.171*** 
(3.39) 
0.175*** 
(5.82) 
0.398*** 
(4.02) 
0.138*** 
(3.97) 
0.153*** 
(7.07) 
Technological gap -0.049*** 
(5.09) 
-0.047*** 
(5.20) 
-0.042* 
(2.26) 
-0.026*** 
(5.13) 
-0.030*** 
(6.95) 
      
Product market regulation -0.002 
(0.96) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.126*** 
(3.41) 
-0.008 
(1.65) 
0.008** 
(2.81) 
Labour market regulation 0.008 
(1.45) 
-0.004 
(0.79) 
-0.009 
(1.46) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
0.006 
(0.95) 
Financial market regulation 0.005 
(1.31) 
-0.007 
(1.43) 
-0.004 
(0.36) 
0.009 
(1.73) 
0.009* 
(2.01) 
      
Interaction TFP growth at the frontier with 
product market regulation 
 0.016 
(0.41) 
0.416** 
(2.73)  
-0.005 
(0.23) 
-0.040 
(0.98) 
Interaction TFP growth at the frontier with 
labour market regulation 
 0.090** 
(2.43) 
0.080** 
(2.12) 
0.069* 
(1.85) 
0.014 
(0.35) 
Interaction TFP growth at the frontier with 
financial market regulation 
 -0.078 
(1.62) 
-0.127** 
(2.80) 
-0.063** 
(2.55) 
-0.081** 
(2.57) 
      
Interaction technological gap with product 
market regulation 
 -0.007 
(0.90) 
0.064 
(1.17) 
-0.013* 
(2.07) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
Interaction technological gap with labour 
market regulation 
 -0.004 
(0.48) 
-0.007 
(0.47) 
-0.005 
(0.81) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
Interaction technological gap with financial 
market regulation 
 -0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.014 
(0.97) 
0.016** 
(2.34) 
0.007* 
(1.89) 
N. obs. 6340 6340 2929 2043 2271 
R2 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.22 
Notes – Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; fixed effects included for countries, sectors, and years; standard errors robust with respect to 
heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote, respectively, 
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. 
TFP growth at the frontier: TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source: EUKLEMS 
Technological gap: lagged log(TFP level )–log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EUKLEMS 
Product market regulation: indicator of the "knock on" sectoral impact of regulations in non-manufacturing sectors. Standardised variable. Source: 
OECD "Regimpact" indicator 
Labour market regulation: indicator of anti-competitive regulations in the labour market. Standardised variable. Source: Fraser institute freedom 
indicators (taken with negative sign). 
Financial market regulation: indicator of anti-competitive regulations in the financial markets. Standardised variable. Source: Fraser institute 
freedom indicators (taken with negative sign). 
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robustness issues / counter-intuitive results for 
some of the indirect interaction effects, it is clear 
that more research is needed to get a better 
understanding of the role of the regulatory 
environment in explaining cross-country TFP 
growth differentials. In particular, more 
industry-specific regulatory indicators may be 
needed to better understand the effects of a 
more competition-friendly regulatory 
environment on TFP trends. 
Part of the problems experienced with the 
regulatory regressions may be linked to the need 
to use a lower level of disaggregation than the 
broad sectoral aggregates which were used for 
the analysis in Table 12. This is attempted in 
Table 13 which presents results for sectors 
defined at a finer level of industry 
disaggregation. The aim is to identify the key 
TFP growth determinants in those broad 
industry groupings that explain the bulk of the 
euro-area-US TFP differences over the past 
decade.   
Column (1) shows that for the ICT-producing 
industry (i.e. electrical and optical equipment) 
the basic variables behave somewhat differently 
from prior expectations. The frontier and 
technology gap variables are non-significant. 
This result is consistent with the existing 
evidence which suggests that labour productivity 
in the 'high tech' sectors is not converging across 
Table 13: Industry-specific models 
 ICT-producing manufacturing Retail and affiliated industries Utilities 
 Only ICT-
producing 
manufacturing  
Only 
remaining 
industries 
Only retail and 
affiliated 
industries 
Only 
remaining 
industries 
Only 
utilities  
Only 
remaining 
industries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TFP growth at the frontier 0.007 
(0.05) 
0.168** 
(2.34) 
0.152** 
(2.61) 
0.194** 
(2.37) 
0.086 
(0.47) 
0.190*** 
(4.08) 
Technological gap 0.010 
(0.67) 
-0.082** 
(3.28) 
-0.034*** 
(4.26) 
-0.0544*** 
(4.03) 
-0.022 
(0.84) 
-0.048*** 
(4.92) 
       
Interaction TFP growth at 
the frontier with R&D 
 
0.130*** 
(3.50) 
0.016 
(0.38) 
    
Relative contribution of 
private consumption to 
GDP growth  
 
  0.004*** 
(5.08) 
0.001 
(1.80) 
  
Product market regulation     -0.010* 
(2.00) 
0.004 
(0.063) 
Interaction TFP growth at 
the frontier with product 
market regulation 
    0.032 
(0.33) 
0.043 
(1.32) 
Interaction technological 
gap with product market 
regulation 
    -0.115 
(1.06) 
0.005 
(0.90) 
       
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N. obs. 141 2497 836 5030 684 5656 
R2 0.56 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.13 
Notes – Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; fixed effects included for countries, sectors, and years; standard errors robust with respect to 
heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote, respectively, 
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. 
TFP growth at the frontier : TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source: EUKLEMS 
Technological gap : lagged log (TFP level )–log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EUKLEMS 
R&D : R&D expenditure/gross output. Standardised variable. Source: OECD STAN 
Human capital: share of high skill labour compensation in total labour compensation. Standardised variable. Source: EUKLEMS 
Relative contribution of private consumption to GDP growth: GDP growth due to private consumption/GDP growth. Source AMECO. 
Product market regulation: indicator of the "knock on" sectoral impact of regulations in non-manufacturing sectors. Standardised variable. Source: 
OECD "Regimpact" indicator. 
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countries, in contrast with what is observed for 
most other sectors. Interestingly, the results 
change drastically when the same specification is 
tested on 'total industries' excluding the ICT-
producing manufacturing industry (column (2)).  
Regarding retail and wholesale trade services 
(column (3)), the results indicate a significant 
role for cyclical factors in providing a direct 
explanation for observed differences in TFP 
growth between the US and the EU Member 
States (as suggested by the strongly significant 
positive coefficient for the relative contribution 
of private consumption to GDP growth).  Due 
to its construction as a residual term, TFP 
growth also captures productivity improvements 
associated with the better exploitation of scale 
economies, which are likely to be a relevant 
factor in explaining productivity dynamics in this 
group of service industries. It is worth noting 
that a similar positive impact of cyclical factors is 
not observed in the other sectors (column (4)).  
Finally, regarding the 'network' industries, 
product market regulations are shown to have a 
significant negative impact on this grouping of 
industries but not on the rest of the economy. 
This could be related to the deregulation drive 
which has been a feature of those industries over 
the last two decades, with the more pro-
competitive environment created yielding 
significant benefits in terms of overall TFP 
trends. However, these latter benefits are likely 
to be skewed more towards one-off static 
efficiency gains than permanent dynamic effects.  
3.  Summary and policy implications  
Over the last decade many euro-area Member 
States have experienced a slowdown in their 
productivity performances relative both to 
previous time periods and to other developed 
OECD economies, most notably the US. Our 
analysis has shown that most of the euro-area-
US differences are not to be found in investment 
patterns but are mainly driven by developments 
in TFP. At the sectoral level, the deterioration in 
the euro-area's relative performance mostly 
reflects the insufficient contribution to TFP 
growth of the high technology part of the 
manufacturing sector and of the private services 
sector. The analysis actually shows that a small 
group of industries is responsible for most of the 
euro area's productivity weakness, namely 
electrical and optical equipment; wholesale and 
retail trade; financial services; and other business 
services. On a more encouraging note, there is 
one area of the economy where the euro area 
has managed to consistently outperform the US 
in TFP terms over the recent years, namely the 
'network' industries.  
Analysing econometrically the determinants of 
TFP growth, a relatively clear finding is that, 
whilst there is a generalised tendency toward 
catching up across countries in terms of TFP 
level, it seems to be weakening over time, 
especially in the post-1995 period. For the ICT-
producing manufacturing sector this process of 
catching-up is particularly weak. In contrast, 
TFP growth appears increasingly associated with 
innovation and technological spillovers from 
countries positioned at the 'technology frontier'. 
TFP growth is also likely to benefit more from 
innovation at the technology frontier if there is 
more intensive use of R&D and human capital.  
The regression analysis suggests that the TFP 
trends in those specific industries where euro-
area-US differences are concentrated can be 
attributed to a relatively wide spectrum of 
factors. Whereas the relative under-performance 
of the euro-area's ICT producing manufacturing 
industry (mainly semiconductors) is linked to 
issues of R&D intensity, the divergences in the 
retail and wholesale trade industries relate to 
cyclical factors and the better exploitation of 
scale economies. Finally, with regard to the euro-
area out-performance in the network industries, 
there is evidence to suggest that these are mainly 
linked to one-off static efficiency gains 
associated with the sustained deregulation drive 
which occurred in these industries over the last 
two decades.   
Regarding the policy implications that can be 
derived from the analysis, two tentative points 
can be made: 
Firstly, the TFP patterns which have emerged 
over recent decades, especially since the mid-
1990s, indicate a growing need for a more 
intensive use of R&D and high-skilled human 
capital in frontier economies. Rather than an 
increase in the resources devoted to R&D and 
higher education (in itself necessary, provided 
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that their efficiency and effectiveness is secured) 
what seems to matter most is the provision of 
adequate framework conditions to facilitate the 
reallocation of these scarce knowledge-intensive 
resources towards those industries which can 
deploy them most productively.  
Secondly, the highly diverse range of factors 
which the present analysis has highlighted as 
potential contributors to the ongoing euro-area-
US TFP differences, may suggest a need to 
adopt a more targeted, industry-level approach 
to structural reform efforts. In this context, the 
present focus section should be seen more as an 
attempt to raise questions and to indicate 
avenues for further research than as providing 
clear policy recommendations.  
  
 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2007 
 
 
 
- 46 - 
IV. Recent DG ECFIN publications  
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 6. 2007 
2007 Convergence Report on Cyprus and Malta 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/convergencereports_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 7. 2007 
Autumn economic forecasts 2007 – 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 8. 2007 
The EU Economy: 2007 Review 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2007/the_eu_economy_review2007_en.ht
m  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 31. June 2007 
2006 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of candidate countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers31_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 32. June 2007 
2006 Economic and Fiscal Programmes of potential candidate countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers32_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 33. June 2007 
Main results of the 2007 fiscal notifications presented by the candidate countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers33_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 34. June 2007 
Guiding principles for product market and sector monitoring 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers34_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 35. November  2007 
Pensions schemes and projection models in EU-25 Member States 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers35_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents   
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 283.  
Jan in 't Veld (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
The potential impact of the fiscal transfers under the EU Cohesion Policy Programme 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers283_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 284.  
Björn Döhring and Aurora Mordonu (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
What drives inflation perceptions? A dynamic panel data analysis 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers284_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 285.  
Sven Langedijk and Martin Larch (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Testing the EU fiscal surveillance: How sensitive is it to variations in output gap estimates? 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers285_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 286.  
Christian Buelens, Gaëlle Garnier, Roderick Meiklejohn (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)  
and Matthew Johnson (U.K. Office of Fair Trading)  
The economic analysis of state aid: Some open questions 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers286_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 287.  
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Christian Gayer (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)  
A fresh look at business cycle synchronisation in the euro area 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers287_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 288.  
Hoda Abdel-Ghaffar Yousse - (Former trainee - Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Towards Inflation Targeting in Egypt: Fiscal and institutional reforms to support disinflation efforts 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers288_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 289.  
Roel Beetsma (University of Amsterdam, CEPR and CESifo) and Heikki Oksanen (European Commission, 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and Growth Pact 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers289_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 290.  
Douglas Koszerek, Karel Havik, Kieran Mc Morrow, Werner Röger and Frank Schönborn (European Commission, 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
An overview of the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers290_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 291.  
A. Melander, G. Sismanidis and D. Grenouilleau (European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs) 
The track record of the Commission's forecasts - an update 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers291_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 292.  
Christian Dreger (coordinator of the study), Konstantin Kholodilin, Kirsten Lommatzsch, Jirka Slacalek (German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) and Przemyslaw Wozniak (Center for Social and Economic Research 
(CASE Warzaw) 
Price convergence in the enlarged internal market 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers292_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 293.  
C. Martinez-Mongay, L.A. Maza Lasierra and J. Yaniz Igal (European Commission, Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs)  
Asset Booms and Tax Receipts: The case of Spain, 1995-2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers293_en.htm 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -4.7 -7.3 2.3 6.1 4.9 4.8 2.7 1.7 2.5
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 2.1 1.3 4.0 0.0 0.7 1.2 -0.8 -- --
  2004 2005 2006 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch  2.0 1.5 2.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7
2 Private consumption 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -13.9 -13.8 -9.0 -1.9 -1.8 -3.7 -5.6 -6.1 -8.0
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.5 1.2 2.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 --
  2004 2005 2006 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.5 1.5 1.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 --
3 Investment 2004 2005 2006 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.6 81.3 83.0 82.5 83.6 83.9 84.4 84.8 84.3
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch 1.9 2.8 5.4 2.7 0.8 1.7 1.9 -0.2 --
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 --
4 Labour market 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.9 8.9 8.3 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.2 --
   2004 2005 2006 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 --
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.4 2.3 3.8 3.1 4.4 5.0 5.0 6.1 6.6
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.5 --
5 International transactions  2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -13.2 -15.6 -1.1 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
 World trade 5.2 Index 146.2 157.0 172.3 184.0 187.4 189.9 186.1 -- --
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1149.0 1242.5 1396.4 126.1 124.3 129.9 131.0 -- --
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 1078.0 1225.1 1405.6 121.0 124.7 126.2 126.6 -- --
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 71.0 17.4 -9.1 5.1 -0.4 3.7 4.3 -- --
   2004 2005 2006 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 6.9 4.4 7.9 1.5 1.1 3.1 0.8 0.8 --
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 6.7 5.1 7.7 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.0 0.5 --
   2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 61.9 8.6 -12.7 6.9 3.8 4.5 0.6 -- --
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -66.9 -208.8 -136.5 -37.4 0.1 -7.2 -22.6 -- --
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 72.1 141.3 276.3 70.6 30.2 21.9 46.2 -- --
6 Prices  2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.0
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 --
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.9 3.5 4.4 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.7 3.3 --
 Import prices6.4 Index 97.2 104.8 112.9 114.3 116.0 --  
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.0 2.1 2.9 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.7 --
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.3 --
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 2804.6 3207.1 3793.3 4470.2 4449.0 4220.6 4284.4 4430.8 --
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.8 7.4 8.5 11.0 11.7 11.6 11.3 12.3 --
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 6.0 8.1 11.0 10.8 11.0 11.2 11.0 11.2 --
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.24 1.24 1.26 1.34 1.37 1.36 1.39 1.42 --
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 109.8 109.7 111.4 115.3 115.9 115.5 116.4 117.5 119.3
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Total employment, domestic concept, seasonally and working day adjusted Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Wages and salaries. Labour cost index, industry and services (excluding 
public administration), nominal, working day adjusted  
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods, 2000=100  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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